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EXAMINING THE JPMORGAN “PRINCELING”1 
SETTLEMENT: 
INSIGHT INTO CURRENT FOREIGN CORRUPT 
PRACTICES ACT (FCPA) INTERPRETATION AND 
ENFORCEMENT 
  
 
BEVERLEY EARLE* AND ANITA CAVA** 
 
ABSTRACT 
Shortly after the November 2016 U.S. Presidential election, JP Morgan 
Chase and JP Morgan Securities (Asia Pacific) settled and signed a non-
prosecution agreement (NPA) in which they agreed to pay over $264 million 
to the DOJ, SEC and the Federal Reserve.  The entities acknowledged that 
 
 
1 Princelings was used in the past in China to refer to children of rulers: 
The term was coined in the early 20th century, referring to the son of Yuan Shikai (a self-
declared emperor) and his cronies. It was later used to describe the relatives of the top four 
nationalist families; Chiang Kai-shek's kin, Soong Mei-ling's kin, Chen Lifu's kin, and Kong 
Xiangxi's kin. After the 1950s, the term was used to describe Chiang Ching-kuo, son of Chiang 
Kai-shek, and his friends in Taiwan. Today's princelings include the children of the Eight 
Elders and other recent senior national and provincial leaders. 
Princelings, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Princelings (last visited July 29, 2017). The term 
is now used to describe the offspring of the ruling elite in China: 
The children of veteran communists who held high-ranking offices in China before 1966, the 
first year of the Cultural Revolution, are commonly called ‘princelings.’ There are princelings 
by birth — sons and daughters of former high ranking officers and officials of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) — and princelings by marriage. Princelings by birth could also be 
further divided into subcategories: princeling politicians, princeling generals, and princeling 
entrepreneurs. 
Bo Zhiyue, Who are China’s Princelings?, DIPLOMAT, Nov. 24, 2015, 
http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/who-are-chinas-princelings.  
* University of Pennsylvania, B.A., Boston University School of Law, J.D.; Professor Emerita, 
formerly the Gregory H. Adamian Professor of Law and also Chair, Department of Law, Taxation and 
Financial Planning, Bentley University, Waltham, MA. 
** Swarthmore College, B.A. with Distinction, J.D. New York University School of Law, Hays 
Fellow; Professor of Business Law, University of Miami Business School; Director of Business Ethics 
Program and Co-Director of UM Ethics Programs.   
The authors wish to thank Brian M. Stewart for his research assistance as well as Bentley University 
and University of Miami for their research support.  We also acknowledge the cogent comments made 
by colleagues who attended The Anti-Corruption Law Interest Group of the American Society of 
International Law (ASIL) conference, CONTROLLING CORRUPTION: POSSIBILITIES, 
PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS & BEST PRACTICES, January 13-14, 2017, which was supported by 
the Wharton School’s Zicklin Center for Business Ethics Research, University of Miami’s UM Ethics 
Programs and the Arsht Initiatives, and Bentley University. 
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they had engaged in quid pro quo arrangements with Chinese officials for 
a number of years, employing relatives deemed “princelings” in return for 
favored treatment.  Although JP Morgan Chase had ended the program in 
2013, evidence of willful and widespread violations of the FCPA resulted in 
little prosecutorial credit.  We examine this and other recent “princeling” 
cases and declinations, analyzing as well both the legal context of the very 
few litigated FCPA cases and recent corruption and insider trading cases 
for insight and guidance. We also consider the current political 
environment and assess its impact on FCPA enforcement. We conclude with 
lessons for companies trying to aggressively pursue business while 
complying with the law.  
  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol17/iss2/7
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INTRODUCTION 
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), enacted by the U.S. 
Congress in 1977, criminalized the paying of bribes to foreign officials by 
individuals and entities from the United States as well as those whose 
transactions touched the United States.2 Although prosecutions initially 
were very rare, their number increased substantially starting in 2007.3  
In 2013, the government began investigating several U.S. companies 
with a pattern of hiring sons and daughters of public officials in China. 
Three years later, BNY and Qualcomm settled cases involving so-called 
“princeling” hiring programs.4 During this time period, the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) also conducted an investigation of the “Sons and Daughters” 
hiring program at JPMorgan Chase and JPMorgan Securities (Asia Pacific) 
Limited (“JPMorgan APAC”) (a Hong Kong-based subsidiary of JPMorgan 
Chase & Co.) that lasted three years and included one hundred interns as 
well as full time employees hired based on referrals of foreign officials.”5   
In an interesting decision from a timing perspective, JPMorgan decided 
to resolve its dispute with the government in late November 2016, despite 
President-elect Trump’s public comments hostile to the FCPA in the past.6 
The company reached a $264 million settlement agreement7 regarding its 
 
 
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1-3 (2012). 
3 See infra note 19 and accompanying graph. 
4 See Beverley Earle & Anita Cava, The “Princelings” and the Banks: When Does a Legitimate 
Business Practice Become Criminal Corruption in Violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act?, 37 
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 107, 114-16 (2016); Suzanne Barlyn, U.S. Fines Qualcomm for Hiring Relatives 
of China Officials: SEC, REUTERS (Mar. 1, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-qualcomm-
corruption-idUSKCN0W35G7.  
5 Press Release, Dep’t of Just., JPMorgan’s Investment Bank in Hong Kong Agrees to Pay $72 
Million Penalty for Corrupt Hiring Scheme (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/jpmorgan-
s-investment-bank-hong-kong-agrees-pay-72-million-penalty-corrupt-hiring-scheme; Press Release, 
Sec. and Exchange Comm’n, JPMorgan Chase Paying $264 Million to Settle FCPA Charges (Nov. 17, 
2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-241.html. This enforcement action places 
JPMorgan on a “top ten Disgorgement list,” with the SEC calling $130.5 million “disgorgement” and 
$25 million “pre-judgment interest.” See Richard L. Cassin, JPMorgan Lands on the FCPA Top Ten 
Disgorgement List, FCPA BLOG (Nov. 23, 2016, 9:28 AM), 
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2016/11/23/jpmorgan-lands-on-the-fcpa-top-ten-disgorgement-
list.html.  
6 See Sue Reisenger, Trump Spoke Out Against Prosecuting Companies for Bribery, CORP. 
COUNSEL (Nov. 10, 2016), http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202772127968/Trump-Spoke-Out-
Against-Prosecuting-Companies-for-Bribery (discussing Trump’s May 2012 comments and showing 
video CNBC clip). 
7 Of that amount, $72 million was to go to the Department of Justice (DOJ), $130 million was to go 
to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and $62 million was to go to the Federal Reserve. 
See Dep’t of Just., supra note 5; SEC, supra note 5; Press Release, Fed. Res., Federal Reserve Board 
Orders JPMorgan Chase & Co. to Pay $61.9 Million Civil Money Penalty (Nov. 17, 2017), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/enforcement/20161117a.htm. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol17/iss2/7
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hiring individuals to obtain quid pro quo benefits from Chinese entities8 and 
JPMorgan APAC signed a non-prosecution agreement (NPA),9  despite 
reports that the case may not be completely over as some issues are still 
being investigated.10   
Reportedly, other banks are still under review for their hiring practices 
in Asia.11 In SEC filings, Citigroup recently disclosed an ongoing 
investigation “concerning compliance with Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
and other laws . . . with respect to the hiring of candidates referred by or 
related to foreign government officials.”12 In this instance, however, the 
country disclosed as involved was not China. It will not be a surprise if 
similar settlements follow. 
CEO Jaime Dimon has made a passionate defense of the need to 
understand the importance of flexibility in doing business.13 Recent 
commentators have expressed some sympathy for that argument: 
JPMorgan was far from the first bank to use its princeling hires as 
leverage. According to a Bloomberg report, JPMorgan ramped up its 
hiring program after the bank lost a key deal to competitor Deutsche 
Bank in 2009. The daughter of the client’s chairman worked for 
Deutsche. It’s not hard to see how “quid pro quo” deals could be 
tempting for global banks operating in an often inhospitable market. 
Banking is a protected core industry under the Chinese Communist 
Party, and Western banks have been losing market share to domestic 
Chinese competitors over the last decade. Advisers to companies 
raising capital often come across sensitive corporate financial data—
 
 
8 See Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Letter to Attorney Mark F. Mendelsohn, Esq., (Counsel for 
JPMorgan) (Nov. 17, 2016), at 2, https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/911206/download 
(“certain senior executives and employees of the company conspired to engage in quid pro quo 
agreements with Chinese officials to obtain investment banking business, planned and executed a 
program to provide specific personal benefits to senior Chinese officials in the position to award or 
influence the award of banking mandates, and repeatedly falsified or caused to be falsified internal 
compliance documents in place to prevent the specific conduct at issue here.”). 
9 See Dep’t of Just., supra note 5.  
10 Id.  
11 See Aruna Viswanatha, J.P. Morgan Settlement Lays Bare the Practice of Hiring “Princelings,” 
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 17, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/j-p-morgan-to-pay-264-million-to-end-
criminal-civil-foreign-corruption-cases-1479398628 (mentioning Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche 
Bank, Goldman Sachs, HSBC Holdings, Morgan Stanley and UBS). See infra note 95 and accompanying 
text regarding Citigroup’s hiring practices. 
12 Richard L. Cassin, Feds Investigate Citigroup for ‘Princeling’ Hiring Practices, FCPA BLOG 
(Feb. 27, 2017, 7:08 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2017/2/27/feds-investigate-citigroup-for-
princeling-hiring-practices.html.  
13 See infra note 54 and accompanying text. 
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information Beijing may not want foreign banks to see.14 
JPMorgan went to extreme lengths to obtain business from its Asian 
clients, reflecting a degree of insouciance about the enforcement of the 
FCPA that bears scrutiny and analysis.  This paper attempts to examine this 
first and then considers consequent issues.  One question is whether and 
how President Trump’s Department of Justice appointees will change the 
interpretation of the FCPA, thereby affecting settlement decisions. A more 
interesting question may be what will happen in future cases where the 
evidence is less damning than the apparent “smoking guns” in JPMorgan 
Chase emails, spreadsheets and faux-compliance policies. Would a referral 
of a candidate from either a foreign official or a well-connected foreign 
applicant be viewed as a normal course of business or a violation of federal 
law?   
This paper will analyze current FCPA settlements and the sparse new 
case law. We will review recent decisions in the domestic legal environment 
for how quid pro quo is interpreted in the bribery and insider trading context 
to see if there is any analogy to the less-litigated FCPA context.  We will 
look at cases with language regarding over-enforcement or criminalization 
of business conduct.  In addition, we examine the political climate in light 
of the recent presidential election—including possible violations of election 
law prohibiting solicitations of “anything of value”15—for insight into 
FCPA enforcement. We conclude with some lessons for business gleaned 
from JPMorgan and other settlements and the broader legal environment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 Fan Yu, ‘Princeling’ Hirings Complicate Business in China for Global Banks, EPOCH TIMES 
(Mar. 1, 2017), http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/2227066-princeling-hires-complicate-global-banks-
operations-in-china.  
15 Bob Bauer, Not Just a Personal Problem for Trump Jr.–Now Trouble for Trump Campaign and 
Trump Sr., JUST SECURITY (July 11, 2017, 12:11 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/43013/personal-
problem-trump-jr-now-trouble-trump-campaign-trump-sr:  
Under campaign finance regulations, the meeting could without question be considered a 
solicitation (at least under the facts so far known).  The law defines a solicitation to include any 
request for a contribution, or “anything of value,” even if the request is implicit in the 
circumstances rather than expressly communicated.  The regulations provide specifically that 
the solicitation “may be made directly or indirectly,” based on all relevant factors, including 
the “conduct of the persons involved in the communication. 
(emphasis added).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol17/iss2/7
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II. CURRENT FCPA:  PRINCELING SETTLEMENTS ET AL. 
A. FCPA Brief History 
The United States’ Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), passed in 
1977, criminalized bribing foreign officials by offering them “anything of 
value” to assist in “obtaining or retaining business.”16  A section of the 
FCPA imposed additional obligations on publicly traded companies to 
maintain accurate books and records.17  A violation of the books and records 
provision is easier to prove than the exchange of value for “obtaining or 
retaining business,” a quid pro quo arrangement.  The statute was not 
vigorously enforced until relatively recently, after the 1997 OECD 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials,18 which 
reflected a growing international consensus on the corrosive corruption of 
bribery on economic development. This history is reflected in the statistics 
graphically displayed by Stanford researchers.19 
 
In 2016, the U.S. government collected $2.48 billion under the FCPA, 
the largest amount of money to date in one year.20 The FCPA Blog reported 
the top ten biggest FCPA cases, including three new 2016 cases but not the 
 
 
16 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (2012). 
17 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (2012). 
18 OECD, CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS (2011), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
bribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf. For a discussion on how the OECD affected FCPA 
enforcement, see Beverley Earle & Anita Cava, When is a Bribe Not a Bribe? A Re-Examination of the 
FCPA in Light of Business Reality, 23 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. Rev. 111, 142 (2013).  
19 DOJ and SEC Enforcement Actions, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT CLEARINGHOUSE, 
http://fcpa.stanford.edu/statistics-analytics.html (last visited July 29, 2017). 
20 Richard L. Cassin, The FCPA Enforcement Index, FCPA BLOG (Jan. 3, 2017, 8:08 AM), 
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2017/1/3/the-2016-fcpa-enforcement-index.html. 
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JPMorgan Chase case:    
 
Siemens (Germany):    $800 million, 2008 
Alstom (France):     $772 million, 2014 
KBR/Halliburton (USA):   $579 million, 2009 
Teva Pharmaceutical (Israel):  $519 million, 2016 
Och-Ziff (USA):     $412 million, 2016 
BAE (UK):      $400 million, 2010 
Total SA (France):    $398 million, 2013 
VimpelCom (Holland):   $397.6 million, 2016 
Alcoa (USA):      $384 million, 2014 
Snamprogetti Netherlands  
B.V./ENI S.p.A (Holland/Italy): $365 million, 201021  
 
Seven of the top ten include foreign companies, which fuels some 
international distrust that the United States’ enthusiasm for this statute stems 
in part from a desire to punish foreign competitors.22 This list also 
underscores the emerging effect of international cooperation in addressing 
bribery and corruption, notably the implementation of the UK Bribery Act23 
and increasingly zealous enforcement of national laws.24 There is no doubt 
the last decade is a vastly different legal context from the early years of the 
FCPA.25 
Thomas Fox, an influential FCPA blogger, dubbed 2016 the “Year in 
FCPA Corporate Enforcement” in his recently published book of the same 
 
 
21 Richard L. Cassin, Teva Ranks Fourth on Our New Top Ten List, FCPA BLOG (Dec. 27, 2016, 
8:22 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2016/12/27/teva-ranks-fourth-on-our-new-top-ten-list.html. 
22 See Leslie Wayne, Foreign Firms Most Affected by a U.S. Law Barring Bribes, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
3, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/04/business/global/bribery-settlements-under-us-law-are-
mostly-with-foreign-countries.html.  
23 Bribery Act 2010, c. 23 § 7(2) (Eng.). 
24 See, e.g., Jason Jones, Amelia Medina & Kyle Sheahen, After Odebrecht: Coordinated 
International Enforcement is the New Reality, FCPA BLOG (Mar. 23, 2017, 7:08 AM), 
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2017/3/23/after-odebrecht-coordinated-international-enforcement-is-
the.html; Michael Volkov, Serious Fraud Office Makes Big Splash with UK Bribery Act Resolution with 
Rolls Royce, CORRUPTION, CRIME & COMPLIANCE (Jan. 31, 2017), 
https://blog.volkovlaw.com/2017/01/serious-fraud-office-makes-big-splash-uk-bribery-act-resolution-
rolls-royce; Laura Clare & Rob Elvin, Fighting Corruption and Fraud–the ICU and SFO, 
ANTICORRUPTION BLOG (Apr. 6, 2016), http://www.anticorruptionblog.com/uk-bribery-act/fighting-
corruption-and-fraud-the-icu-and-sfo. 
25 See, e.g., MIKE KOEHLER, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT IN A NEW ERA 31–38 (2014); 
Earle & Cava, supra note 4, at 111-12. For an understanding of FCPA enforcement over the last decade, 
see Thomas Fox, Three Enforcement Weeks to Remember, FCPA BLOG (Jan. 19, 2017, 12:56 PM), 
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2017/1/19/tom-fox-three-enforcement-weeks-to-remember.html; 
Cassin, supra note 20 (listing FCPA enforcement actions and amounts for the years 2008 through 2016). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol17/iss2/7
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title.26 He underlines the flurry of enforcement activity between late 
December 2016 and President Trump’s swearing-in-office in January of 
2017, which amounted to almost “20 billion in fines and penalties” and 
exceeded what had been collected in the fiscal year 2016.27 Fox suggests 
“[t]he reasons for the settlements vary from corporation to corporation but 
one overriding reason is certainty.”28 He also notes “timing” as a factor; 
companies that do not settle will have to negotiate with a whole new set of 
individuals.29 
Knowing what the penalty might be provides certainty and often leads 
to a stock price rise.30 It is worth noting, however, that Walmart appears to 
reject this fear of uncertainty as it has yet to make a deal with the 
government with respect to their longstanding bribery investigation.31 
B. JPMorgan Settlement, November 17, 2016 
JPMorgan Chase and its Asian entity started the “Sons and Daughters 
Program” in 2006 and ended it in 2013, when the government began its 
investigation.32 As noted above, the entities entered into the close to quarter-
billion-dollar settlement in late November 2016.33 Prior to reaching the deal, 
JPMorgan fired six individuals and reportedly disciplined over twenty 
employees.34 Interestingly, despite policy announcements promising 
 
 
26 THOMAS FOX, 2016 – THE YEAR IN CORPORATE FCPA ENFORCEMENT (2017); cf. Thomas Fox, 
New Book Release: 2016 – The Year in Corporate FCPA Enforcement, FCPA BLOG (May 26, 2017, 
7:18 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2017/5/26/new-book-release-2016-the-year-in-corporate-
fcpa-enforcement.html.   
27 See Fox, supra note 25. 
28 Id.  
29 Id. Perhaps companies have been guided by the common idiom: “Better the devil you know than 
the devil you don’t.” 
30 Id.; see also Sue Reisinger, In Hectic Month, DOJ Rakes in Billions from Corporations, CORP. 
COUNS. (Jan. 20, 2017), http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202777331775/In-Hectic-Month-DOJ-
Rakes-in-Billions-From-Corporations.  
31 According to media reports in May 2017, Walmart is close to finalizing a $300 million settlement 
with the government regarding FCPA violations in Mexico and Asia.  This figure is about half of what 
was reportedly expected about six months ago, according to various sources. Tom Schoenberg, Wal-
Mart Close to Resolving Bribery Probe for $300 Million, BLOOMBERG (May 9, 2017, 3:40 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-09/wal-mart-said-close-to-resolving-bribery-
probe-for-300-million.  
32 See Ned Levin, How a Chinese Company Pressed J.P. Morgan to Make Hires, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 
18, 2016, 3:08 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-a-chinese-company-pressed-j-p-morgan-to-
make-hires-1479498681.  
33 See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text. See also Earle & Cava, supra note 4, at 147-48. 
34 See Ben Protess & Alexandra Stevenson, JPMorgan Chase to Pay $264 Million to Settle Foreign 
Bribery Case, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2016,) 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/18/business/dealbook/jpmorgan-chase-to-pay-264-million-to-settle-
foreign-bribery-charges.html?_r=0 (“The bank . . . disciplined nearly two dozen employees and ‘took 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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increased personal criminal liability in FCPA cases,35 the DOJ did not 
pursue that option in this situation, even though there was particularly strong 
evidence of intent to garner business through the hiring program.36 The DOJ 
describes the case in specific terms.  
In 2006, responding to numerous requests from its clients, JPMorgan 
Chase and its Asian entities designed a “referral hiring” stream affording 
less-rigorous screening and less-demanding employment for targets of 
opportunity.37 In the settlement agreement, the firm admitted that “[u]nder 
the revamped Client Referral Program, referred candidates for employment 
needed . . . a ‘[d]irectly attributable linkage to business opportunity’ to be 
considered for a job.”38 A 2006 email regarding this policy makes clear that 
the firm both knew about and was concerned by the compliance issues 
arising under the program: “As you know, the firm does not condone the 
 
 
significant employment action’ that led to the departure of six employees who participated in the 
misconduct.”). 
35 Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Attorney General, to All United States 
Attorneys, et al. (Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/file/769036/download (“Yates 
Memo”) (re: “Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing”). For more on the Yates Memo, see 
generally Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Att’y Gen., Remarks at the Second Annual Global Investigations 
Review Conference (Sept. 22, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-
leslie-r-caldwell-delivers-remarks-second-annual-global-0; The Yates Memo, FCPA PROFESSOR (Sept. 
11, 2015), http://fcpaprofessor.com/the-yates-memo; What Others are Saying About the “Yates Memo,” 
FCPA PROFESSOR (Sept. 17, 2015), http://fcpaprofessor.com/what-others-are-saying-about-the-yates-
memo.   
36 Yates made an impassioned argument that the DOJ would pursue individual criminal prosecutions 
in cases involving corporate fraud: 
[R]egardless of how challenging it may be to make a case against individuals in a corporate 
fraud case, it’s our responsibility at the Department of Justice to overcome these challenges and 
do everything we can to develop the evidence and bring these cases.  The public expects and 
demands this accountability. Americans should never believe, even incorrectly, that one’s 
criminal activity will go unpunished simply because it was committed on behalf of a 
corporation.  We could be doing a bang-up job in every facet of the department’s operations – 
we could be bringing all the right cases and making all the right decisions.  But if the citizens 
of this country don’t have confidence that the criminal justice system operates fairly and applies 
equally – regardless of who commits the crime or where it is committed – then we’re in trouble.  
Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen., Remarks at New York University School of Law Announcing 
New Policy on Individual Liability in Matters of Corporate Wrongdoing (Sept. 10, 2015), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-sally-quillian-yates-delivers-remarks-new-
york-university-school. Despite these promises, the number of FCPA enforcement actions dropped 
significantly following the Yates Memo. See Sharon Oded, Yates Memo – Time for Reassessment?, 
COMPLIANCE & ENFORCEMENT (Apr. 20, 2017), 
https://wp.nyu.edu/compliance_enforcement/2017/04/20/yates-memo-time-for-reassessment; Kristen 
Savelle, FCPA Criminal Prosecutions One Year After the Yates Memo, WALL ST. J.: RISK & 
COMPLIANCE BLOG (Oct. 7, 2016, 6:00 AM), 
https://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2016/10/07/fcpa-criminal-prosecutions-one-year-after-the-
yates-memo;  The Yates Memo – One Year Later, FCPA PROFESSOR (Sept. 12, 2016), 
http://fcpaprofessor.com/yates-memo-one-year-later.    
37 JP Morgan Chase & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 79, 355, at 5 (Nov. 17, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2016/34-79335.pdf.  
38 Dep’t of Just., supra note 8, at A-3-4, para. 12. 
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hiring of the children or other relatives of clients or potential clients of the 
Firm . . . for the purpose of securing or potentially securing business for the 
Firm. In fact, the Firm’s policies expressly forbid this.”39 
Accordingly, in that same year, the firm developed a Compliance 
Questionnaire for the “Sons and Daughters” program with specific 
questions designed to assure that the intended hire had been appropriately 
vetted, had the necessary qualifications, and had been subjected to a 
screening process that included competitive applicants.40  Without a doubt, 
however, the form was either completely ignored or filled out in advance, 
sometimes with the assistance of individuals charged with enforcing 
compliance rules within the bank.41 For example, a question regarding the 
intended benefit to the firm of the intended hire was pre-filled with “no 
expected benefit”.42 In 2009, an email to a supervisor from a managing 
director stated:  
One specific item that we may need your help is how to run a better 
sons and daughter program, which has almost a linear relationship 
with mandates in China. People believe [other investment banks] are 
doing a much better job. On the other hand, we J.P. Morgan have had 
a few disastrous cases which I can share with you later. We have more 
LoBs [lines of business] in China therefore in theory we can 
accommodate more ‘powerful’ sons and daughters that could benefit 
the entire platform.43 
During the time period in question, “approximately 200 hires were made 
under the program, including almost 100 from referrals made by clients at 
Chinese SOEs [state-owned and controlled enterprises], which generated 
more than $100 million revenue and at least $35 million in profit for JPM 
APAC.”44 
A number of other emails were equally damaging. For example, 
regarding the hiring request of a Chinese executive of a private Chinese 
company, one JPMorgan executive in Hong Kong wrote: “I am supportive 
of bringing her on board given what’s at stake. . . . how do you get the best 
 
 
39 Id. at A-4, para. 14.  
40 JP Morgan Chase & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 79, 355, at 6. (Nov. 17, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2016/34-79335.pdf. 
41 Id. at 6-7.  
42 Dep’t of Just., supra note 8, at A-6, para. 18. 
43 Id. at A-6–7, para. 19.  
44 Case Information: In the Matter of JPMorgan Chase & Co., FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 
CLEARINGHOUSE, http://fcpa.stanford.edu/enforcement-action.html?id=630 (last visited July 31, 2017).  
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quid pro quo from the relationship upon confirmation of the offer?”45 The 
firm successfully secured the business. Unquestionably, such emails 
provided the proverbial “smoking gun” that directly linked business deals 
with accommodation of relatives’ expressed suggestions of employment. 
Such language reflects textbook disregard for the requirements of the 
FCPA. Obviously, specifically referring to quid pro quo strategy eliminates 
any argument that such was not the intent. Indeed, the bank admitted that 
these hires did not meet minimum qualifications, even to the extent of 
recognizing that at least one of the hires functioned as a photocopier.46 In 
addition, incriminating evidence included a spreadsheet created by the 
company to track the return on investment between particular hires and the 
resulting business.47 
By 2011, the company had updated its Global Anti-Corruption Policy to 
include broad definitions that stated, “almost anything can meet the 
definition of a ‘bribe,’ including . . .  internships [and] employment.”48 The 
policy also stated, “[n]o employee may directly or indirectly offer, promise, 
grant or authorize the giving of money or anything else of value to a 
government official to influence official action or obtain improper action.”49 
The investigation focused on occurrences before 2011 and details with 
specificity the “the corrupt use” of the program starting in 2007. JPMorgan 
Asia-Pacific Securities Ltd, JPMorgan APAC, and JPMorgan Chase & Co 
JPMC all acknowledged that they  
conspired to engage in quid pro quo agreements with Chinese 
officials to obtain investment-banking business, planned and 
executed a program to provide specific personal benefits to senior 
Chinese officials in the position to award or influence that award of 
banking mandates, and repeatedly falsified or caused to be falsified 
internal compliance documents in place to prevent the specific 
conduct at issue . . . .50  
As part of its settlement agreement, the company must report for three 
years on compliance programs and agreed to two follow-up “confidential” 
reviews to monitor compliance with the agreement. 51 It also agreed to 
address the deficiencies in compliance with a revamped monitoring 
program, training, internal investigation and enforcement, implementation 
 
 
45 Dep’t of Just., supra note 8, at A-11, para. 33 (emphasis added).  
46 See id. at Att. A, para. 25. 
47 Id. at Att. A, para. 23. 
48 Id. at Att. A, para. 17. 
49 Id.  
50 Id. at 2.  
51 Id. at Att. C, 1-2.  
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of new policies, reviews and adequate procedures for mergers and 
acquisitions and third parties.52 
Although JPMorgan did not “voluntarily and timely disclose,” the 
company earned cooperation credit from the government as a result of  
conducting a thorough investigation, making regular factual 
presentations to the Offices, voluntarily making foreign-based 
employees available for interviews in the United States, producing 
documents to the Offices from foreign countries in ways that did not 
implicate foreign data privacy laws, and collecting, analyzing, and 
organizing voluminous information for the Offices.53 
In a 2014 CNBC interview, Andrew Ross Sorkin asked JPMorgan Chase 
CEO Jamie Dimon about his company’s practice of hiring Chinese 
princelings. Dimon responded by implying it was common practice among 
banks and other large companies. 
I think we’re trying to make decisions that try to make us as pure as 
possible, that we’re trying to do the right thing. And you know, I think 
the—I think everyone’s got to go look back at the rules, not just the 
banks by the way, this is, like—it’s been a norm of business for years 
that people hire, you know, ex government officials, they hire sons 
and daughters of companies, and give them proper jobs and don’t 
violate, you know, [the] Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. But we got to 
figure out exactly how to create a safe harbor for that so you don’t . . 
. [get]  punished.54 
Professor Mike Koehler, a critic of FCPA enforcement for straying too 
far from the law as written, has objected to the JPMorgan settlement.55 In 
particular, he notes that the government made no findings regarding corrupt 
intent of individuals associated with JPMorgan, instead focusing on the 
 
 
52 Id. at Att. B, 1–7 (Corporate Compliance Program).  
53 Id. at 1.   
54 CNBC Exclusive: CNBC Transcript: CNBC’s Andres Ross Sorkin Sits Down with Jamie Dimon, 
JPMorgan Chase Chairman & CEO, Today, (CNBC television broadcast Jan. 23, 2014), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2014/01/23/cnbc-exclusive-cnbc-transcript-cnbcs-andrew-ross-sorkin-sits-
down-with-jamie-dimon-jpmorgan-chase-chairman-ceo-today.html; see also Emily Glazer, Dan 
Fitzpatrick & Jean Eaglesham, J.P. Morgan Knew of China Hiring Concerns Before Probe, WALL ST. 
J. (Oct. 23, 2014, 11:56 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/j-p-morgan-was-aware-of-overseas-hiring-
concerns-before-u-s-probe-1413998056; William K. Black, Jamie Dimon: U.S. Must Create a “Safe 
Harbor” Where JPM’s Corruption is Not “Punished,” NEW ECON. PERSPECTIVES (Oct. 24, 2014), 
http://neweconomicperspectives.org/2014/10/jamie-dimon-u-s-must-create-safe-harbor-jpms-
corruption-punished.html.  
55 See generally Mike Koehler, JPMorgan - A Trifecta of Off-the-Rails FCPA Enforcement, 12 
BLOOMBERG L. WHITE COLLAR CRIME REP. 1 (2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2927327. 
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intent of JPMorgan APAC.56 Nonetheless, ignoring traditional agency 
theory the DOJ held JPMorgan responsible despite finding no individuals 
criminally culpable. Koehler also questioned what “thing of value” the 
Chinese officials received as well as the finding that the internships were a 
personal benefit to requesting officials.57 According to Koehler, this broad 
interpretation of the law is simply not challenged as there is little to no 
judicial review of the government’s argument and analysis. In referring to 
this situation as “going off the rails,” Professor Koehler quotes former SEC 
chairman Arthur Levitt:  
SEC regulators now suggest that such hiring overseas is a form of 
untoward influence, akin of bribing foreign officials to win business. 
This accusation is scurrilous and hypocritical. If you walk the halls 
of any institution in the U.S.—Congress, federal courthouses, large 
corporations, the White House, American embassies and even the 
SEC—you are likely to run into friends and family members of 
powerful and wealthy people.58 
Koehler also quotes a New York Times columnist: “[b]ut hiring the sons 
and daughters of powerful executives and politicians is hardly just the 
province of banks doing business in China: it has been a time-tested practice 
here in the United States”59 In announcing the settlement, exiting SEC 
Enforcement Director Andrew Ceresney noted, “some have argued that 
employment of a child, friend or relative could not possibly induce a foreign 
official to take action. Today’s action demonstrates the falsity of that 
assertion.”60 
Subsequently, the Federal Reserve announced that it will go after two 
individual bankers serving as managing directors of J.P. Morgan Securities 
(Asia Pacific) Limited who were in charge. They will seek fines of $1 
million and $500,000 respectively, and “permanent bans” from the banking 
industry. 61 Fang, the subject of the $1 million fine, had reportedly said in 
 
 
56 Id. at 4.  
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 7–8 (quoting Arthur Levitt, Commentary, ‘Influence Peddling’ Makes the World Go Round, 
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 25, 2013, 3:55 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304858104579262624243252560?mod=WSJ_
Opinion_LEFTTopOpinion). 
59 Id. at 8 (quoting Andrew Ross Sorkin, Hiring the Well-Connected Isn’t Always a Scandal, N.Y. 
TIMES: DEALBOOK (Aug. 19, 2013, 9:14 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/08/19/hiring-the-
well-connected-isnt-always-a-
scandal/?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=1A5D8BC92F50A22CDA50032F51EFFA0B&gwt=pay).  
60 See Viswanatha, supra note 11.  
61 Press Release, Fed. Res., Federal Reserve Board Seeks to Fine and Prohibit Two Former 
Managing Directors at J.P. Morgan Securities (Asia Pacific) from Employment in Banking Industry 
(Mar. 10, 2017), 
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2009, “[y]ou all know I have always been a big believer of the sons and 
daughters program- it almost has a linear relationship with mandates, at least 
in China. We lost a deal to [a competitor] today because they got a 
chairman’s daughter work for them this summer. I am supportive to have 
our own program.”62 He was reported to have approval power connected to 
hires.63 Timothy Fletcher, the junior person, was also singled out and, 
according to the Fed, heard the business case for potential hires.64 However, 
there have been no findings yet and Fang is planning to vigorously contest.65 
C. BNY Mellon and Qualcomm settlements 
BNY Mellon entered into a settlement agreement over the SEC’s 
allegations of FCPA violations in hiring three interns between 2010 and 
2011.66 This case involved a much more limited set of facts than in 
JPMorgan. The three were relatives of government officials connected to a 
Middle East Sovereign Wealth Fund,67 hired without interviews, and had 
not been eligible for the regular intern program because of their grade point 
average.  Further, they were not enrolled in a graduate program.68 Like the 
JPMorgan case, there were some incriminating emails, e.g., “I want more 
money for this,” suggesting looking for an increase in deposits as a result of 
the favor.69 The deposits then increased by $689,000.70 BNY made no 
admission of guilt but paid a total fine of $14.8 million.71 
Although Qualcomm did not admit or deny SEC findings, it settled with 
the SEC on March 1, 2016, for $7.5 million for violating the FCPA when it 
 
 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/enforcement20170310a.htm; see also 
Richard L. Cassin, Fed Seeks Lifetime Ban for Bankers Who Ran JP Morgan ‘Princeling’ Program, 
FCPA BLOG (Mar. 13, 2017, 7:28 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2017/3/13/fed-seeks-lifetime-
ban-for-bankers-who-ran-jp-morgan-princel.html.  
62 Press Release, Fed. Res., Notice of Intent to Prohibit and Notice of Assessment, In re Fang Fang, 
Docket No. 17-006-E-I/CMP-I, at 5 (Mar. 9, 2017), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/enf20170310a1.pdf.   
63 Id. at 4–5. 
64 Press Release, Fed. Res., Notice of Intent to Prohibit and Notice of Assessment, In re Timothy 
Fletcher, Docket No. 17-007-E-I/ CMP-I, at 5 (Mar. 9, 2017), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/enf20170310a2.pdf. 
65 Cassin, supra note 61. 
66 See Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges BNY Mellon with FCPA Violations (Aug. 18, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-170.html.  
67 The Bank of New York Mellon Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 75720, at 2 (Aug. 18, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2015/34-75720.pdf. 
68 Id. at 6. 
69 Id. at 5. 
70 Id. at 4.  
71 SEC, supra note 66. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
380 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 17:365 
 
 
 
hired relatives of foreign officials in China to increase the chances of being 
selected as a mobile technology provider.72 There were only several 
identified instances of improper hires, but they were well-documented, 
including two interns deemed as “must place” or “g[iving] us great help for 
. . . new business development,” suggesting a return favor.73 Qualcomm also 
gave a university $75,000 for a research grant allowing the son of a Chinese 
foreign Official to stay in his Ph.D. program. A Qualcomm executive also 
personally loaned the son of a foreign official $70,000 to buy a home.74 The 
scope and organization of Qualcomm’s activities were only a fraction of 
JPMorgan’s, yet one can see that the CEO believed that reciprocal favors 
have long been a staple of business and the underlings at JPMorgan had 
been trying to systematize the messy process of doing favors in China to 
expand the business. 
D. Declinations under the 2016 “Pilot Program” and its Extension 
In April of 2016, the DOJ unveiled the Pilot Program, offering the 
possibility of a declination with voluntary disclosure, full cooperation and 
remedial compliance.75 Although the DOJ has not issued its final report, it 
appears that twenty-two voluntary disclosures were made under this 
program between April 2016 and May 2017.76 On March 10, 2017, the 
government announced an extension of the Pilot Program, with at least 
temporary effect.77 According to Kristen Savelle of the Wall Street Journal: 
Of the 18 entity groups that resolved FCPA claims with the DOJ 
during the first year of the pilot program, seven (or 39%) voluntarily 
disclosed their FCPA misconduct…Fourteen of the 18 entity groups 
(78%) cooperated . . . and four entity groups (22%) partially 
 
 
72 Press Release, SEC, SEC: Qualcomm Hired Relatives of Chinese Officials to Obtain Business 
(Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-36.html; Qualcomm Inc., Exchange Act 
Release No. 77261 (Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2016/34-77261.pdf.  
73 SEC, Qualcomm Hired Relatives, supra note 72. 
74 Id.  
75 Press Release, DOJ, Criminal Division Launches New FCPA Pilot Program (Apr. 5, 2016), 
https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog/criminal-division-launches-new-fcpa-pilot-program; Sue 
Reisinger, DOJ’s FCPA Pilot Program Wins Some White-Collar Praise, to a Point, CORP. COUNS. (Apr. 
14, 2017, 9:40 AM), http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202783718706/DOJs-FCPA-Pilot-Program-
Wins-Some-WhiteCollar-Praise-to-a-Point; Ross Todd, DOJ Sweetens Rewards for FCPA Cooperation, 
RECORDER (Apr. 6, 2016, 5:51 PM), http://www.therecorder.com/id=1202754323643.  
76 Sue Reisinger, FCPA Pilot Program Nets 22 Voluntary Disclosures in Past Year: DOJ, NAT’L 
L.J. (May 17, 2017, 4:41 PM), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202786528262/FCPA-Pilot-
Program-Nets-22-Voluntary-Disclosures-in-Past-Year-DOJ.  
77 Kristen Savelle, The FCPA Pilot Program One Year Later, WALL ST. J: Risk & Compliance J. 
(Apr. 19, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2017/04/19/the-fcpa-pilot-
program-one-year-later/?mg=prod/accounts-wsj.  
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cooperated. Similarly, 14 of the 18 entity groups (78%) voluntarily 
remediated flaws in their internal controls and compliance policies, 
while four entity groups (22%) partially remediated those flaws. The 
DOJ required nine of the 18 entity groups (50%) to retain an 
independent compliance monitor as a term of settlement.78 
The scope of penalty reductions ranged from 50% to 30%; by 
comparison, the reductions for companies that did not self-report was 15-
25%.79 Of note, ten of the eighteen companies were foreign entities. 
Although many lawyers see no harm in the program, the question really 
turns on quantifying the benefit. Indeed, corporate counsel still debate the 
wisdom of self-reporting. As one lawyer put it, the Pilot Program “does help 
to create some parameters … but the biggest question—whether the Justice 
Department will decline or not—really is not defined in the program.”80  
The DOJ will continue the program during its review.81 Lanny Breuer, 
former Assistant Attorney General, commented, “[t]here are very desirable 
benefits to the program but they are still discretionary.”82 He believes a 
problem with self-disclosure and cooperation is that a company may be 
asked to stop its internal investigation and let the government do the first 
interviews. In government speak, this is called “de-confliction.” He noted 
that asking publicly traded companies to stand down from an internal FCPA 
investigation is “an extraordinary request, in my view.”83 
Our analysis of the five declinations offered by the DOJ in 201684 and 
 
 
78 Id.  
79 Id.  
80 See Reisinger, supra note 75. 
81 Richard L. Cassin, DOJ Will Keep Pilot Program After April Expiry During Evaluation, FCPA 
BLOG (Mar. 10, 2017, 11:28 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2017/3/10/doj-will-keep-pilot-
program-after-april-expiry-during-evalua.html.  
82 Samuel Rubenfeld, Lanny Breuer Has Doubts About FCPA Pilot Program, WALL ST. J.: Risk & 
Compliance J. (Oct. 26, 2016, 2:43 PM), https://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2016/10/26/lanny-
breuer-has-doubts-about-fcpa-pilot-program; see also -Richard L. Cassin, Lanny Breuer: Pilot Program 
Falls Short, FCPA BLOG (Oct. 28, 2016, 8:18 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2016/10/28/lanny-
breuer-pilot-program-falls-short.html.  
83 Rubenfeld, supra note 82. 
84 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, In re Nortek, Inc. (June 3, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-
fraud/file/865406/download (DOJ Declination Letter to Nortek); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, In re Akamai 
Tech, Inc. (June 3, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/865411/download (DOJ 
Declination Letter to Akamai Technologies); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, In re Johnson Controls, Inc. (June 
21, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/874566/download (DOJ Declination Letter to 
Johnson Controls); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,  In re HMT LLC (Sept. 29, 2016), 
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/899116/download (DOJ Declination Letter to HMT); U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, In re NCH Corp. (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-
fraud/file/899121/download (DOJ Declination Letter to NCH).   
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the two made public by mid-June 201785 reveals some tangible benefits of 
the Pilot Program. Focusing first on the 2016 group, each declination is 
specifically prefaced by a reference to the Pilot Program and then each lists 
the ways in which the target company met the requisite elements.  Although 
the published Declination letters recite the different underlying facts, all 
give credit for: (a) prompt and voluntary self-disclosure; (b) thorough 
internal investigation; (c) “fulsome” cooperation, including identifying both 
the relevant facts and the individuals responsible for the wrongdoing; (d) 
enhanced compliance efforts; and (e) “full remediation” including 
termination of specific employees and, notably, high-level executives.   
Of the five, In re HMT LLC offers the most detail, outlining a complex 
scheme involving transactions that hid commissions being paid to local 
agents for HMT, who funneled about $500,000 to officials in Venezuela and 
China to secure business.  According to the Declination, the company 
realized almost $3 million in profits over a period of ten years, 2001–2011. 
Further, the letter refers to evidence, including emails, that U.S. based 
regional managers knew of these bribes being paid in both countries.86 
June 16, 2017 marked the new administration’s first Declination with 
disgorgement with respect to a case involving foreign bribery,87 followed 
the next week by a second, similar resolution, In re CDM Smith.88 The first, 
In re Linde, concerned a subsidiary, Spectra, that had been purchased by 
Linde in 2006.  Agents of that company made payments to public officials 
in the Republic of Georgia in connection with buying equipment used to 
make boron gas.  As in the 2016 cases, the DOJ gave substantial credit to 
Linde for touching the requisite elements of the Pilot Program.  
Interestingly, “Linde trades on German stock exchanges . . . [b]ut neither it 
nor its U.S. entities have securities registered with the SEC.”89 
Linde was ordered to disgorge its profit of  $1,430,000,  Spectra’s profit 
of  $6,300,000, and $3,415,000 that went to Georgian officials, a total of 
$11,145,00090  Linde had already segregated $10 million, which the 
architects of the scheme were planning to pocket, so it was not a financially 
 
 
85 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, In re Linde North America Inc. (June 16, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/page/file/976976/download (DOJ Declination Letter to Linde 
North America); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, In re CDM Smith (June 21, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/page/file/976976/download (DOJ Declination Letter to CDM 
Smith). 
86 In re HMT LLC, supra note 84. 
87 In re Linde, supra note 85. 
88 In re CDM Smith, supra note 85. 
89 Richard Cassin, Linde Pays $11 Million for Declination with Disgorgement, FCPA BLOG (June 
20, 2017, 11:28 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2017/6/20/linde-pays-11-million-for-declination-
with-disgorgement.html.  
90 In re Linde, supra note 85. 
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difficult penalty. However, this declination with disgorgement is a new 
result in theory in that a declination involves no wrongdoing, but requiring 
disgorgement appears to suggest a penalty. It has been noted that three of 
the previous six declinations also involved non-issuers such as Linde.91 
Lucinda Low is a legal powerhouse – formerly the President of the 
American Society of International Law and partner at Steptoe & Johnson 
LLP. It is interesting that such a knowledgeable practitioner is availing 
herself of this DOJ tool and going forward with self-disclosure although 
they had segregated the bulk of funds to disgorge and those who were out 
of pocket were the three executives planning to line their own pockets with 
ill-gotten gains. Sometimes when doing the right thing causes no financial 
pain, it is not a difficult choice. 
A similar and familiar story is outlined in the Declination for CDM 
Smith, which secured about $4 million in profits for contracts related to 
highway design and construction and water projects in India by paying 
about $1.8 million in bribes to public officials.92  Again, evidence revealed 
that senior managers of the firm knew that bribes were being paid to 
subcontractors, “who provided no actual services and understood that 
payments were meant to solely benefit the officials.”93   
E. Post-Princeling Settlements:  Citigroup and Walmart? 
In February 2017, Citigroup announced it was being investigated for 
hiring practices94similar to those adopted by JPMorgan and Morgan 
Stanley. It is difficult to tell whether this is a minor situation of a half-dozen 
incidents or a more major scheme involving 200 or more hires and a much 
larger potential fine. The disclosure does not offer details other than 
Citigroup is cooperating and does not indicate whether there was self-
disclosure.95 
In October 2016, during the waning days of the Obama administration, 
Walmart purportedly rejected a proposal to pay $600 million to settle the 
 
 
91 Cassin, supra note 89. 
92 In re CDM Smith, supra note 85. 
93 Id.  
94 See Cassin, supra note 12. 
95 The FCPA blog published the full text of the FCPA disclosure in Citigroup’s SEC filing on 
February 24, 2017:  
Government and regulatory agencies in the U.S., including the SEC, are conducting 
investigations or making inquiries concerning compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act and other laws with respect to the hiring of candidates referred by or related to foreign 
government officials. Citigroup is cooperating with the investigations and inquiries.  
Id.  
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FCPA investigation that had dragged on for six years.96 However, in May 
of 2017, reports surfaced that the parties were close to reaching a $300 
million settlement.97  Walmart has spent $840 million on the investigation 
into its compliance failures as well as in upgrading its compliance 
processes; currently, about 2,300 employees are involved in compliance 
operations.98 Historically, an FCPA internal investigation takes an average 
of four years, but the process for Walmart has lasted about six years.99 
The government’s promises to act more efficiently are not new, but have 
been reiterated once again.100 At a conference in early 2017, Trevor 
McFadden, DOJ Criminal Division Acting Principal Deputy Assistant 
Attorney General, spoke approvingly of executives who “want to get 
compliance right.”101 However, a recent Ernst & Young survey seems to 
contradict the notion of this being a pervasive attitude, as three-quarters of 
respondents indicate they “could justify unethical behavior if it would help 
business survive and 27% said using bribery to win contracts is a common 
practice in the business sector.”102 
III. LEGAL CONTEXT 
Understanding the legal context of FCPA enforcement requires a certain 
amount of imagination. Given the paucity of judicial pronouncements on a 
topic worthy of some serious comment,103 scholars and counsel are forced 
to speculate on the strength of the government’s legal case versus the cost 
of defending it. Other scholars have dissected the sparse record by analyzing 
the cases and opinion releases.104 We will not do that, for those approaches 
 
 
96 Michael Addady, Walmart Rejects Paying $600 Million Settlement in Bribery Investigation, 
FORTUNE (Oct. 7, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/10/07/Walmart-bribery.  
97 Aruna Viswanatha & Sarah Nassauer, U.S. Asks Wal-Mart to Pay $300 Million to Settle Bribery 
Probe, WALL ST. J. (May 9, 2017, 5:46 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-asks-wal-mart-to-pay-
300-million-to-settle-bribery-probe-1494366397.  
98 Id.  
99 Reisinger, supra note 76.  
100 Sue Reisinger, DOJ Pledges to Speed Up FCPA Investigations, CORP. COUNS. (Apr. 19, 2017, 
3:57 PM), http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202784080772/DOJ-Pledges-to-Speed-Up-FCPA-
Investigations.  
101 Id.  
102 Id. 
103 See generally Earle & Cava, supra note 18 (discussing problems associated with interpreting the 
FCPA and similar laws given the lack of judicial opinions). 
104 See, e.g., Mike Koehler, Measuring the Impact of Non-Prosecution and Deferred Prosecution 
Agreements on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 497, 557–65 (2015); 
Peter R. Reilly, Justice Deferred is Justice Denied: We Must End Our Failed Experiment in Deferring 
Corporate Criminal Prosecutions, B.Y.U. L. REV. 307, 317–19  (2015);  Barry J. Pollack & Annie 
Wartanian Reisinger, Lone Wolf or the Start of a New Pack: Should the FCPA Guidance Represent a 
New Paradigm in Evaluating Corporate Criminal Liability Risks?, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 121, 123–28 
(2014); Philip M. Nichols, Are Facilitating Payments Legal?, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 127 (2013); Mike 
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have been sufficiently plumbed.105 However, a spate of court cases in recent 
months offer interesting opportunities to analyze the FCPA. Because of the 
lack of cases litigated under the FCPA, we look to other areas of the law 
where we may be able explore analogies to the quid pro quo contemplated 
in FCPA for a crime. 
A. New Cases 
1. US v. Hoskins 
Lawrence Hoskins, a former British executive of Alstom U.K. (based in 
Paris), was alleged to have employed consultants to bribe public officials in 
Indonesia in order to secure a $118 million construction contract. Indicted 
by the U.S. government in 2013, Hoskins successfully argued that, as a non-
resident foreign national, he could not be “charged with conspiracy to 
violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act or with aiding and abetting a 
violation of the FCPA, unless the government . . .  show[s] that he acted as 
an agent of a ‘domestic concern’ or while physically present in the United 
States.”106 
That the federal district court analyzed the jurisdictional framework of 
the FCPA and the legislative history of the statute to determine that the 
government’s attempt to impose liability on Hoskins directly, and not as an 
agent, runs afoul of limitations on accomplice liability established by 
Gebardi v. United States in 1932.107 In that case, the Supreme Court held 
“that where Congress excludes a class of individuals from liability under a 
criminal statute, the government may not rely on accomplice theories of 
liability to prosecute those same individuals . . . [and] could not circumvent 
those limitations by charging Hoskins as an accomplice or co-
 
 
Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907 (2010). 
105 Koehler, supra note 104; see generally Philip M. Nichols, The Good Bribe, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 647 (2016); Philip M. Nichols, The Neomercantilist Fallacy and the Contextual Reality of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 203 (2016); Matthew C. Stephenson, Beware 
Blowback: How Attempts to Strengthen FCPA Deterrence Could Narrow the Statute’s Scope, in THE 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE CRIME AND FINANCIAL MISDEALING (Jennifer Arlen ed., 2016); 
Andrew Spalding, Corruption, Corporations, and the New Human Right, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1365 
(2014); Andrew B. Spalding et al., 3.14 Rio 2016 and the Birth of Brazilian Transparency, in EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY – GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT: SPORT (2016); Steve Salbu, Extraterritorial Restriction of 
Bribery: A Premature Evocation of the Normative Global Village, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 224 (1999). 
106 Ryan Rohlfsen & Joshua Asher, No FCPA Jurisdiction Based Solely on Conspiracy and 
Accomplice Liability, Court Rules, FCPA BLOG (Apr. 22, 2016, 8:28 AM), 
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2016/4/22/no-fcpa-jurisdiction-based-solely-on-conspiracy-and-
accompli.html; United States v. Hoskins, 123 F. Supp. 3d 316 (D. Conn. 2015). 
107 Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112 (1932). 
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conspirator.”108 
The Second Circuit heard the appeal of this decision in March of 2017.109 
Commentators note that the DOJ has staked out a broad interpretation of its 
power to prosecute individuals associated with foreign companies with a 
U.S. entity even though no personal connection exists, even including this 
position in its official Guidance.110 Accordingly, if the district court ruling 
is upheld, the government may have to rely more heavily on the Money 
Laundering Control Act (MLCA) in international bribery cases in the 
future.111 
2. Kokesh v. SEC 
In Kokesh v. SEC,112 the Supreme Court resolved a split between the 
Tenth and the Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeal regarding the SEC’s long-
held position that disgorgement is not a penalty, but rather an equitable 
remedy intended to address ill-gotten gains.113 The issue turned on a very 
interesting issue of public policy, namely identifying the underlying 
rationale for imposing disgorgement upon an SEC target. The unanimous 
Supreme Court agreed with the more conservative Eleventh Circuit, holding 
that “[d]isgorgement in the securities-enforcement context is a ‘penalty’ 
within the meaning of §2462, and so disgorgement actions must be 
commenced within five years of the date the claim accrues.”114 
Although this was not an FCPA case, it has important ramifications as 
noted in the Stanford FCPA Clearinghouse: 
Although disgorgement has been available as a monetary sanction 
since the 1970s, the SEC did not actually seek disgorgement in an 
FCPA action until SC v. ABB Ltd. in 2004. Since then, a large 
majority (122 of 178 or 60%) of the SEC’s FCPA enforcement 
actions have included disgorgement as a monetary sanction. In these 
122 cases, the SEC sought over $3.1 billion in disgorgement plus 
 
 
108 Rohlfsen & Asher, supra note 106.  
109 Second Circuit Hears Oral Argument in U.S. v. Hoskins, FCPA PROFESSOR (Mar. 6, 2017), 
http://fcpaprofessor.com/second-circuit-hears-oral-argument-u-s-v-hoskins/.  
110 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. 
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 11–14 (2012), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-
fraud/legacy/2015/01/16/guide.pdf [hereinafter RESOURCE GUIDE].  
111 Rohlfsen & Asher, supra note 106. 
112 Kokesh v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017). 
113 Id.; see also George M. Clarke, Kokesh v. SEC: Are Disgorgement Payments Still Deductible 
Under Code Section 162?, BAKER MCKENZIE (June 23, 2017), 
http://www.bakermckenzie.com/en/insight/publications/2017/06/kokesh-v-sec (offering good 
background on Kokesh). 
114 Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1639.  
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interest. When compared with the almost $318 million that the SEC 
imposed in civil fines during the same period, it is clear that 
disgorgement has become a powerful tool in the SEC’s arsenal. 
The Kokesh decision has the potential to change the way the SEC 
approaches FCPA enforcement. Going forward, the SEC will have to 
focus on conduct and sanctions within the five-year statute of 
limitations period or seek tolling agreements from defendants, who 
may be less willing to comply in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling. 
The decision may also result in pressure to resolve investigations 
more quickly in order to minimize potential limitations concerns, 
thereby also possibly reducing the agency’s leverage in settlement 
negotiations.115 
The impact of this decision will not be measured for several years. 
3. Bio Rad Whistleblower 
An interesting 2017 decision involves a former general counsel, Sanford 
Wadler, who sued Bio Rad Laboratories, Inc. for retaliatory termination in 
violation of the whistleblower protections of Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-
Frank.116 In 2013, Wadler had submitted a report to the Audit Committee 
revealing that company representatives were delivering free products as 
gifts to distributors in China.117 Two years later, Bio Rad signed a NPA with 
the DOJ and paid $55 million to conclude the ensuing FCPA investigation, 
with a $14.35 million penalty for failure to maintain adequate books and 
records and failure to have adequate controls in Russia, and $40.7 million 
as disgorgement to the SEC.118 The calculations were based in part on the 
 
 
115 Email from FCPAC Mailing List, Supreme Court Tightens SEC’s Ability to Seek Sanctions, 
(June 9, 2017, 1:16 PM) (on file with author); SULLIVAN & CROMWELL, LLP, Kokesh v. SEC: U.S. 
Supreme Court Holds That a Five-Year Statute of Limitations Applies When the SEC Seeks 
Disgorgement in Enforcement Actions, FCPA CLEARINGHOUSE (June 6, 2017),  
https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_Kokesh_v_SEC_US_Supreme_Cour
t_Holds_That_a_Five_Year_Statute_of_Limitations_Applies_When_the_SEC_Seeks_Disgorgement_i
n_Enforcement_Actions.pdf. 
116 See Richard L. Cassin, FCPA Whistleblower: Former Bio-RAD GC Awarded $10 Million for 
Retaliatory Firing, FCPA BLOG (Feb. 7, 2017, 7:53 AM), 
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2017/2/7/fcpa-whistleblower-former-bio-rad-gc-awarded-10-million-
for.html; David Ruiz, Ousted Bio-Rad GC Wins Whistleblower Case, 123–28RECORDER (Feb. 6, 2017, 
8:20 PM), http://www.therecorder.com/more-latest-news/id=1202778583134/Ousted-BioRad-GC-
Wins-Whistleblower-Case. For further background on the case, see Wadler v. Bio-Rad Labs., Inc., 141 
F. Supp. 3d 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
117 Wadler, 141 F. Supp. 3d at 1008–09. 
118 See Richard L. Cassin, Bio-Rad Pays $55 Million to Settle FCPA Offenses, FCPA BLOG (Nov. 
3, 2014, 1:46 PM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2014/11/3/bio-rad-pays-55-million-to-settle-fcpa-
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$35 million in profit, made both in China and in Russia, where agents for 
Bio Rad were paid commissions although they performed no services. 
Similar payments were made in Thailand and Vietnam.119  
Despite Wadler’s good job evaluation the previous year, Bio Rad 
asserted he had been fired for poor performance per a review dated July 
2013. In fact, evidence showed that this assessment had been created one 
month after his termination, which itself happened shortly after he went to 
the Audit Committee.120 Wadler had been with the company for twenty-four 
years and testified that its FCPA compliance program was only a “paper 
effort.”121  
In his opening statement, Wadler’s counsel warned the jury that the 
defense would attempt to portray Wadler as clueless about compliance and 
an “FCPA slacker.”122 The company also offered evidence that Wadler 
seemed to be behaving in an erratic fashion and arguments that he had 
become a whistle-blower to avoid being held accountable for FCPA 
compliance failures.123 Nonetheless, the jury’s vote suggests the after-the-
fact performance evaluation implied by metadata analysis persuaded the 
jury at least in part.124 Further, as Wadler’s counsel rhetorically asked on 
cross-examination of the company’s external expert in trial: “[i]f Wadler’s 
claims were so obviously without evidence, why did Davis Polk take five 
months to complete the investigation, generating billings of more than 
$900,000”125  
After deliberating only three hours, the jury awarded Wadler $2.9 
million in back pay and stock options plus $5 million in punitive 
damages.126 Back pay damages were doubled per the provisions of Dodd-
 
 
offenses.html.  
119 Press Release, DOJ, Bio-Rad Laboratories Resolves Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation 
and Agrees to Pay $14.35 Million Penalty (Nov. 3, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bio-rad-
laboratories-resolves-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-investigation-and-agrees-pay-1435. 
120 See Ruiz, supra note 116. 
121 David Ruiz, Ousted GC Details ‘Paper-Only’ Compliance Program at Bio-Rad in Whistleblower 
Trial, CORP. COUNS. (Jan. 18, 2017, 9:20 PM), 
http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202777088503/Ousted-GC-Details-PaperOnly-Compliance-
Program-at-BioRad-in-Whistleblower-Trial.   
122 Cara Bayles, Jury Awards Bio-Rad’s Ex-GC $8M for Retaliatory Firing, LAW360 (Feb. 6, 2017, 
10:12 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/888816/jury-awards-bio-rad-s-ex-gc-8m-for-retaliatory-
firing.  
123 Id.  
124 See Ruiz, supra note 116. 
125 David Ruiz, Davis Polk Partner Says Bio-Rad GC Kept Pushing Flimsy Claims, AM. LAW. (Feb. 
2, 2017, 4:18 PM), http://www.americanlawyer.com/id=1202778339824/Davis-Polk-Partner-Says-
BioRad-GC-Kept-Pushing-Flimsy-Claims. 
126 See Ruiz, supra note 116; David Ruiz, James Wagstaffe Defeated Bio-Rad with Storytelling, 
CORP. COUNS. (Feb. 14, 2017, 5:52 PM), http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202779172268/James-
Wagstaffe-Defeated-BioRad-With-Storytelling.  
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Frank, bringing the total to 10.8 million.127 This case exposes the inner 
working of a company attempting to jettison an employee whom they 
blamed in part for this FCPA problem. It is unusual because the lawyer who 
could not find another job did not have much to lose, so he decided to sue 
the company. It shows some of the risk for employees involved in 
compliance if they deviate from the company’s position. It also underscores 
the position companies find themselves in deciding whether to self-report 
while aware of rogue employees contemplating receiving a bounty as a 
whistleblower. The company has appealed the verdict.128 
4. PetroTiger 
Gregory Weisman, general counsel of PetroTiger, received two years of 
probation after cooperating and wearing a wire to record a co-CEO of 
PetroTiger, Joseph Sigelman.129 Allegedly, Weisman and the two co-CEOs 
of the company had used bribes in Colombia to win a $39 million state 
contract. Both CEOs involved also pled guilty and received probation. 
Weisman was disbarred in New York (2014) and Pennsylvania (2015) and 
the SEC barred him from practicing before the Commission.130 Of note in 
the DOJ’s announcement: 
The case was brought to the attention of the department through a 
voluntary disclosure by PetroTiger, which fully cooperated with the 
department’s investigation. Based on PetroTiger’s voluntary 
disclosure, cooperation, and remediation, among other factors, the 
department declined to prosecute PetroTiger.    
No individuals went to jail based on these facts,131 and many of the 
charges were dropped. This illustrates that even when there are cooperating 
witnesses, conviction of the charges the prosecutors initially brought may 
be difficult.132 The pleas leave a lack of developed FCPA case law which 
 
 
127 See Bayles, supra note 122. 
128 Sue Reisinger, Bio-Rad Appeals $11 Million Verdict for Ousted General Counsel, RECORDER 
(Oct. 23, 2017, 3:28 PM), https://www.law.com/therecorder/sites/therecorder/2017/10/23/bio-rad-
appeals-11-million-verdict-for-ousted-general-counsel/?slreturn=20180008221319 (the company 
alleges four errors including that Wadler’s whistleblowing was not protected by Sarbanes-Oxley Act as 
well as “serious evidentiary errors”). 
129 Richard L. Cassin, SEC Bans Former PetroTiger GC, FCPA BLOG (June 5, 2017, 7:18 AM), 
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2017/6/5/sec-bans-former-petrotiger-gc.html.  
130 Id. 
131 See Cassin, supra note 129. 
132  Compare Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, United States v. Enrique Faustino Aguilar, et al., 
(known as Lindsay Mfr.), No. CR 10-01031(A)-AHM (C.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2011), 
https://www.nacdl.org/criminaldefense.aspx?id=21772 (dismissing for prosecutor misconduct). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
390 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 17:365 
 
 
 
leads us to consider non-FCPA cases. 
B. Non-FCPA decisions  
While some might argue cases that do not involve the FCPA are 
inapplicable, others believe that analogies are second best when there is a 
paucity of case law. 133 We turn to look at these cases because they elucidate 
quid pro quo in other contexts. 
1.  Skilling v. United States and Honest Services Fraud 
Much like the FCPA, the honest services fraud statute134 was enacted to 
criminalize a certain type of behavior and, over the years, was very broadly 
interpreted to achieve the government’s desired outcomes.  In simple terms, 
the 1987 statute extended language of the mail and wire fraud statutes to 
specifically make it a crime to be involved in “a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another of the intangible right to honest services.”135 Over the next 
two decades,  
[T]he federal Circuit Courts of Appeal . . . developed very different—
and often inconsistent—standards to determine the existence of 
honest services fraud in the public sector and had virtually accepted 
the notion that a failure to honor fiduciary duties amounted to 
criminal corruption in the private sector.136 
Jeffrey Skilling of Enron challenged his criminal conviction by arguing 
that the foundation for the government’s prosecution, the honest services 
fraud statute, was unconstitutionally vague and therefore poisoned the entire 
case.  In effect, Skilling won the philosophical war although he did not 
prevail in his personal battle:  the Supreme Court limited the reach of the 
statute to “schemes to defraud involving bribes and kickbacks”137 for both 
public and private actors. Skilling’s prison sentence was reduced, but he was 
 
 
133 See James Loonam, U.S. Attorney, PLI’s The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and International 
Anti-Corruption Developments 2017, April 24-25, 2017, N.Y., N.Y. (suggesting they make analogies to 
domestic bribery because there is not much FCPA case law) (on file with author); compare with Matthew 
Stephenson’s criticism of this paper at ASIL Anti-Corruption Interest Group, University of Miami, 
Wharton and Bentley University conference on Controlling Corruption: Possibilities, Practicalities and 
Best Practices, January 13-14, 2017, Miami conference (questioning whether cases that were not FCPA 
ones were relevant) (on file with author). 
134 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012). 
135 Id.  
136 Earle & Cava, supra note 4, at 127 (citing Anita Cava & Brian M. Stewart, Quid Pro Quo 
Corruption is “So Yesterday”: Restoring Honest Services Fraud After Skilling and Black, 12 U.C. 
DAVIS BUS. L.J. 1, 7–9 (2012)). 
137 Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2907 (2010).  
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not released from jail.138 
Obviously, the tangible conduct now required for pursuing criminal 
corruption under the honest services fraud is possibly a new thread in the 
tapestry of future FCPA enforcement.  The egregious language of the 
JPMorgan Chase emails – particularly the remarkably careless use of quid 
pro quo in discussing the expected benefits of employing a particular 
relative139  – seems to meet this rather concrete and strict standard set up for 
a similar sort of criminal statute.   We speculate that the language used in 
future efforts to obtain or retain business in creative ways will be subjected 
to a very high degree of scrutiny by compliance personnel and/or the 
emerging suites of computer programs being designed for that purpose.140 
2. Redefining and restricting liability in public corruption cases 
a) Blagojevich 
Another interesting analogy to the Princelings predicament presented by 
doing business abroad in the current hyper-competitive environment is 
found in a 2015 Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision, United States v. 
Blagojevich.141 In that case, the appellate court considered the bases for 
former Governor of Illinois Rod Blagojevich’s conviction (overturning four 
of the eighteen convictions) and offered insight into the distinction between 
“corruption” and “patronage.” In the court’s view, the explicit offer of a job 
or an opportunity in exchange for something of value, such as money, is 
criminal behavior.142 On the other hand, the court explained that “political 
logroll[ing]” involves the rather expected “swap of one official act for 
another.”143 In effect, the decision recognized the reality of the political 
world of deal-making and the necessity of exchanging favors to accomplish 
 
 
138 See Dominic Rushe, Enron’s Jeffrey Skilling Sees Jail Sentence Reduced to 14 Years, GUARDIAN 
(June 21, 2013, 5:01 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/jun/21/enron-jeff-skilling-
sentence-reduced.   
139 See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
140 For example, IBM is developing its Watson technology in the regulatory and compliance 
environment to help promote adherence to business standards and detect departures from same by 
analyzing language in emails and other communications. Presentation by J. Torney and E. Herbst, 
“Cognitive Computing and Compliance” to UM Business Ethics Program Compliance Network on April 
14, 2016 (on file with the author.)  See also Robert Kugel, IBM Watson and Cognitive Compliance, 
VENTANA RESEARCH (Jan. 2, 2017, 10:30 PM), https://robertkugel.ventanaresearch.com/ibm-watson-
and-cognitive-compliance-1. 
141 United States v. Blagojevich, 794 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 2015). 
142 Id. at 739.  
143 Id. at 735. See also Earle & Cava, supra note 4 at 129–31. 
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desired goals.144 While Blagojevich specifically involves public sector 
decision-making, it offers the opportunity to consider the hiring of well-
educated and well-connected relatives of influential figures in the 
international private business sector from another perspective. However, at 
his resentencing, Blogojevich’s fourteen-year sentence was not altered. We 
wonder whether CEO Dimon’s plea for a degree of understanding and 
flexibility in this arena might find some support when viewed through the 
Blagojevich lens.  
b) McDonnell v. United States 
In June of 2016, a unanimous (8-0) Supreme Court reversed the 
conviction of former Virginia Governor Robert McDonnell and his wife,145 
who had been charged with honest services fraud and Hobbs Act violations 
for taking $175,000 in gifts from a businessman seeking favors for his 
business of nutritional supplements. The government alleged that the 
governor had performed “official acts” interpreting Section 201 of the 
federal bribery statute in exchange for the gifts.146 The District Court 
convicted, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed.  The Supreme Court, however, 
rebuked the prosecutors and the lower courts by holding that merely setting 
up a meeting for a constituent does not rise to the level of a federal violation, 
especially given no state statute prohibiting gifts to elected officials at the 
time. 
Section 201 prohibits quid pro quo corruption—the exchange of a 
thing of value for an “official act.” In the Government’s view, nearly 
anything a public official accepts—from a campaign contribution to 
lunch—counts as a quid; and nearly anything a public official does—
from arranging a meeting to inviting a guest to an event—counts as a 
quo.147 
The Court found this too broad an interpretation. 
There is no doubt that this case is distasteful; it may be worse than 
that. But our concern is not with tawdry tales of Ferraris, Rolexes and 
ball gowns. It is instead with the broader legal implications of the 
 
 
144 See Blagojevich, 794 F.3d at 735 (“A political logroll . . . is the swap of one official act of another. 
. . Governance would hardly be possible without these accommodations, which allow each public official 
to achieve more of his principal objective while surrendering something about which he cares less, but 
the other politician cares more strongly.”). 
145 McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016). 
146 Id. at 2357–58.  
147 Id. at 2372.  
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Government’s boundless interpretation of the federal bribery statute. 
A more limited interpretation of the term “official act” leaves ample 
room for prosecuting corruption, while comporting with the text of 
the statute and the precedent of this Court.148 
c) O’Brien v. United States 
In another legal context, three Boston Department of Probation 
employees appealed their convictions149 prosecuted by Carmen Ortiz, who 
has submitted her resignation.150 A three-judge panel reversed the 
convictions December 19, 2016.151 The First Circuit Court of Appeals 
refused to hear the appeal brought by prosecutors, thus letting the reversal 
of the convictions stand.152 
The three were alleged to have rigged the hiring system in the Probation 
Department to curry favor with legislators, which led to increased funding 
of the department. They had been charged with RICO violations and Mail 
Fraud at the Massachusetts Office of the Commissioner of Probation (OCP). 
The court ruled: 
Although the actions of the defendants may well be judged 
distasteful, and even contrary to Massachusetts personnel laws, the 
function of this court is limited to determining whether they violated 
the federal criminal statutes charged. We find that the Government 
overstepped its bounds in using federal criminal statutes to police the 
hiring practices of these Massachusetts state officials and did not 
provide sufficient evidence to establish a criminal violation of 
Massachusetts law under the Government’s theory the case.153 
Quoting the McDonnell case, the court noted: “the Supreme Court has 
warned against interpreting federal laws ‘in a manner that . . . involves the 
Federal Government in setting standards’ of ‘good government for local and 
 
 
148 Id. at 2375.  
149 United States v. Tavares, 844 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 2016); see also Milton Valencia, Appeals Court 
Overturns Convictions in Probation Department Scandal, BOSTON GLOBE (Dec. 19, 2016), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2016/12/19/appeals-court-overturns-convictions-probation-
department-scandal/1SKDBY2QaVi3BVlqXAoK0K/story.html.  
150 See Bob McGovern, Carmen Ortiz to Step Down as U.S. Attorney, BOSTON HERALD (Dec. 21, 
2016), 
http://www.bostonherald.com/news/local_coverage/herald_bulldog/2016/12/carmen_ortiz_to_step_do
wn_as_us_attorney.  
151 Tavares, 844 F.3d at 49. 
152 Valencia, supra note 150. 
153 Tavares, supra note 152.  
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state officials.’’154 The Court found no link between a “thing of value” 
conferred on an official and an official act.155 
O’Brien is arguably distinguishable from the JPMorgan case, which 
involves a publicly traded company and subsidiary subject to the FCPA 
involved with referrals of relatives of foreign officials. The “thing of value” 
is a job, although there is a question whether this is a benefit to the official. 
That question has not been decided as JP Morgan settled rather than litigated 
the matter. 
d) Samson v. United States 
In a case that prosecutors referred to as the ultimate betrayal of the 
public’s trust in government, an individual with a long record of 
distinguished service pled guilty to having used the power of his office to 
“pressure” United Airlines to offer a non-stop flight from Newark, New 
Jersey to South Carolina.156  David Samson, former New Jersey Attorney 
General and Chairman of the Port Authority Board, acknowledged having 
bribed the airline through its lobbyist and agent “solely because Samson 
wanted it to travel to his house” there.157  Samson suggested the route, 
formerly offered by Continental Airlines, be reinstated in September of 
2011. United considered the possibility and rejected it as unprofitable 
shortly thereafter. Conveniently for Samson, the Port Authority Board was 
scheduled to consider United’s request to build a maintenance hangar at 
Newark Airport at its November 2011 meeting. 158As in the JPMorgan case, 
emails turned out to be the downfall of the parties involved.   
Samson wrote [Jamie Fox, a paid consultant and lobbyist for United 
Continental Holdings] that he was “reviewing current Board agenda 
items of interest.” Referring to the hangar agreement, Fox suggested 
to Samson that “[m]aybe it needs further review!!!!!,” to which 
Samson responded “[y]es, it’s already off this month’s agenda: I hate 
 
 
154 Id. at 54.  
155 Id. at 55.  
156 Press Release, DOJ, Former New Jersey Attorney General and Chairman of the Port Authority 
Board of Commissioners Pleads Guilty to Bribery (July 14, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/usao-
nj/pr/former-new-jersey-attorney-general-and-chairman-port-authority-board-commissioners-pleads.  
This kind of case shakes public confidence in our institutions of government when people who 
are so accomplished, and who have occupied so many positions of public trust, misuse their 
authority to get something for themselves,” U.S. Attorney Fishman said. “It’s a betrayal of our 
trust and what we have the right to expect from those in public life and it makes the job of every 
honest public employee just that much harder. 
Id. 
157 Id.  
158 Id.   
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myself.” Following through on this exchange with Fox, Samson 
caused the hangar agreement to be removed from the Port Authority 
Board’s agenda.159 
Similar sorts of communications ensued over the next few weeks, 
culminating in the following: 
[T]he day before the Port Authority Board’s [December] meeting, 
Samson sent Fox an email telling him that Samson had given 
instructions to remove the hangar agreement from the agenda. Fox 
responded that he thought it was a good time to put the agreement 
back on the agenda and Samson agreed to do so. The Port Authority 
Board then considered the hangar agreement on Dec. 8, 2011 and 
approved it. Fox later emailed Samson: “Finally have their [United’s] 
attention. Having item off/on this week worked,” referring to the 
hangar agreement.160 
This sort of pressure to obtain something “of value,” a personally 
convenient route deemed unprofitable by the airline, offers support for the 
analysis under consideration.  Yet, once again, the case is relatively 
straightforward due to chatter through emails, leaving little room for 
doubting the misuse of official authority.   
David Samson, a former New Jersey Attorney General, distinguished 
lawyer, and close confidant of Governor Christie appointed to the Port 
Authority, pled guilty to bribery for pressuring United Airlines to reinstate 
a discontinued unprofitable airline route to his vacation home in South 
Carolina.161 In return, Samson secured approval for United’s hangar 
expansion in New Jersey. United Airlines was not prosecuted; however, it 
cooperated and paid $2.25 million to settle securities violations of books 
and records and entered into a Non-Prosecution Agreement.162 Samson, 
seventy-seven years old and in poor health, was sentenced to one year of 
home confinement and paid a fine of $100,000.163 The SEC order stated: 
United violated Section 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act because, 
despite the significant potential corruption risks surrounding its 
 
 
159 Id.  
160 Id.  
161 See id. See also United Continental Holdings, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 79454 (Dec. 2, 
2016), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2016/34-79454.pdf; Patrick McGeehan, David Samson, a 
Christie Ally, is Sentenced to Home Confinement, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/06/nyregion/david-samson-bribery-port-authority-new-jersey.html. 
162 United Continental Holdings, Inc., Release No. 79454, supra note 162, at 3. 
163 See McGeehan, supra note 162. 
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dealings with public officials, United failed to design and maintain a 
system of internal accounting controls that was sufficient to prevent 
its officers from approving the use of United’s assets in connection 
with the South Carolina Route in violation of United’s Policies, 
which prohibited the use of assets for corrupt purposes. The ethics 
code in effect in 2011 provided that employees wishing to act in ways 
prohibited by the ethics code could request approval for an exception. 
In this instance, no exception was requested or granted. Indeed, the 
CEO was able to approve the South Carolina Route outside United’s 
normal process because United lacked adequate controls to 
reasonably ensure that prior to authorization of the Transaction an 
exception was obtained from the Director of Ethics and Compliance 
or United’s Board of Directors as required by United’s Policies. The 
failure to seek such prior authorization of the Transaction—which 
required a written submission and any approval to be in writing—
also caused United to violate Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange 
Act because its books and records did not, in reasonable detail, 
accurately or fairly reflect the South Carolina Route Transaction.164  
The Samson case did not become ensnared in the McDonnell problem of 
no clear quid pro quo. In this case, an unprofitable route that continued to 
lose almost $1 million was reinstated for the personal benefit of the 
powerful chairman of the New Jersey Port Authority. It was corruption at 
its clearest –it rarely looks like this. 
e) Silver 
In a “startling”165 development resulting from the June 2016 McDonnell 
decision, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals made headline news in July 
of 2017 when it reversed the 2015 corruption conviction of New York State 
Assemblyman Sheldon Silver. The panel announced that McDonnell 
changed the legal definition of corruption and, as a result, tainted the trial 
court’s jury instructions defining corruption in Silver’s case.166 The issue of 
quid pro quo came into focus once again as Silver (who was once the 
speaker of New York legislature) had his conviction reversed.167 He had 
been convicted of honest services fraud, money laundering, and extortion in 
 
 
164 United Continental Holdings, Inc., Release No. 79454, supra note 162, at 2. 
165 Benjamin Weiser, Sheldon Silver’s 2015 Corruption Conviction is Overturned, N.Y. TIMES (July 
13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/13/nyregion/sheldon-silvers-conviction-is-
overturned.html.  
166 United States v. Silver, 864 F.3d 102, (2d Cir. 2017). 
167 Id. See also Weisser, supra note 166. 
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two schemes where favors where exchanged for over $4 million in referral 
fees.168  For example, in response to a favor for a doctor, the doctor referred 
mesothelioma patients to a law firm. The jury instruction did not incorporate 
the not-yet-issued McDonnell ruling.169 Mr. Silver was sentenced to twelve 
years in prison. The three-judge panel found the jury instruction insufficient 
and that “a properly instructed jury might have reached a different 
conclusion.”170 His counsel had argued at the time “there was no quid pro 
quo.”171 The Court also used the Skilling case as a guide. 
“Prosecutors were concerned from the start that the McDonnell decision 
would allow a lot of reprehensible behavior to go unpunished and that seems 
to be exactly what happened here. . . . This indeed may be the beginning of 
a parade of horribles.”172 This line of cases suggests that there must be a 
specific action traded for money or other value. One nonprofit executive, 
Noah Bookbinder, states the obvious: These cases now provide  
a blueprint to corrupt officials. They’ll understand that if you give 
$50,000 or a Rolex watch, all I have to do is say I will introduce you 
to some people and it will be O.K. . . . Everybody will learn the 
language of corruption. It will still be a bribe, but it will fall outside 
anything that is technically illegal. 173 
The federal appeals court overturned the convictions in the Dean and 
Adam Skelos case, where the former Republican majority leader received 
five years in prison for attempting to use his office to benefit his son.174 The 
McDonnell fallout may continue. 
3. A Unanimous Supreme Court Affirms Liability in Insider 
Trading:  Salman v. United States (2016) 
In December 2016, the Supreme Court decided Salman v. United 
States,175 unanimously (8-0 due to Justice Scalia’s death) reaffirming its 
 
 
168 Silver, No. 864 F.3d, at 104.  
169 Id.  
170 Id.  
171 See Weisser, supra note 166. 
1. 172 ALAN FEUER, SILVER MAY START ‘PARADE OF HORRIBLES’ 
OUT OF MCDONNELL CASE, CRITICS SAY, N.Y. TIMES (JULY 13, 2017), 
HTTPS://WWW.NYTIMES.COM/2017/07/13/NYREGION/SHELDON-
SILVER-BOB-MCDONNELL.HTML.    
(quoting Peter R. Zeidenberg former public corruption prosecutor). 
173 Id.  
174 United States v. Skelos, 707 F. App’x 733 (2d Cir. 2017); see also Weisser, supra note 166; 
Feuer, supra note 173. 
175 Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016). 
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1980 decision in Dirks v. SEC176 and settling a recent difference between 
two Circuit Courts of Appeal regarding the proof required to convict in 
insider trading cases. Maher Kara, a Citigroup investment banker, discussed 
his work with his brother, Michael Kara. Michael helped Maher understand 
some of the science germane to his work and investments. Without telling 
Maher, Michael traded on the relevant information and also gave it to their 
brother-in-law, Bassam Salman. Maher discovered this, but continued 
communicating with his brother, thereby enabling Michael to make over 
$1.5 million in trades that he split with Salman.177 Both Michael and Maher 
pled guilty to insider trading, but their brother-in-law went to trial. Salman 
was convicted and faced a 36-month sentence and $730,000 in restitution.178 
The Court upheld the conviction, providing an analysis relevant to the 
exchange of favors.  Referring to Dirks, it stated:  
In particular, we held that “[t]he elements of fiduciary duty and 
exploitation of nonpublic information also exist when an insider 
makes a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or 
friend.” In such cases, “[t]he tip and trade resemble trading by the 
insider followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient.” 
Our discussion of gift giving resolves this case. Maher, the tipper, 
provided insider information to a close relative, his brother. Dirks 
makes clear that a tipper breaches a fiduciary duty by making a gift 
of confidential information to “a trading relative,” and that rule is 
sufficient to resolve the case. . . .179 (citations omitted).  
The Court further stated that inside information given to a friend or relative 
is the equivalent of a cash gift.180  
The Supreme Court went out of its way to clarify that the Newman case, 
where certiorari was denied, is not controlling: “to the extent the Second 
Circuit held that the tipper must also receive something of a ‘pecuniary or 
similar valuable nature’ in exchange for a gift to family or friends, we agree 
with the Ninth Circuit that this requirement is inconsistent with Dirks.”181 
Salman does not involve the FCPA, which focuses on offering “something 
of value . . . to obtain or retain business” –  an exchange or quid pro quo. 
The JPMorgan settlement had admissions in emails outlining expected quid 
pro quo; therefore, despite early press that JPMorgan might vigorously 
 
 
176 463 US 646 (1983). 
177 Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 424. 
178 Id. at 425.  
179 Id. at 427.  
180 Id. at 428.  
181 Id. (internal citation omitted).  
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defend the method of business of hiring friends to help business,182 they 
decided to settle. No doubt it would have cost more to litigate and arguably 
the bank had already cleaned up its procedures since 2013. 
In another case, U.S. v. Mathew Martoma, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit reaffirmed the 2014 conviction of the SAC 
Capital trader for using insider information from a doctor regarding a drug 
trial.183 Martoma was a portfolio manager at S.A.C. Capital Advisors, 
Steven Cohen’s hedge fund, where he was responsible for investments in 
pharmaceutical and healthcare.184 Martoma paid consulting fees to two 
doctors who were involved in an Alzheimer’s drug (bapineuzumab) trial.185 
The doctors violated their contract by sharing confidential non-public 
information. Although there were some promising results for a few 
participants in the drug trial, the majority of them saw no benefit.186 
Martoma knew this information, but the public did not until Dr. Gilman 
presented the results of the study at an International conference on July 29, 
2008.  The share price of the two participating companies declined by 42% 
and 12%.187  
Because Martoma had advance knowledge, trading activity led to “$80.3 
million in gains and $194.6 million in averted losses for SAC. Martoma 
personally received a $9 million bonus based in large part on his trading 
activity in Elan and Wyeth.”188 Martoma argued “that his conviction should 
still be reversed under Newman because Salman did not overrule Newman’s 
requirement that a tipper have a “meaningfully close personal relationship” 
with a tippee to justify the inference that a tipper received a personal benefit 
from his gift of inside information.” (citations omitted.)189 However, in a 
two to one decision, the Second Circuit disagreed with Martoma’s argument 
and went one step further, stating: 
We conclude that the logic of Salman abrogated Newman’s 
“meaningfully close personal relationship” requirement and that the 
district court’s jury instruction was not obviously erroneous. Further, 
 
 
182 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
183 United States v. Martoma, 869 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 2017); see also Jonathan Stempel, SAC Capital’s 
Martoma Fails to Overturn U.S. Insider Trading Conviction, REUTERS (Aug. 23, 2017, 10:11 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sac-insidertrading-martoma/sac-capitals-martoma-fails-to-overturn-
u-s-insider-trading-conviction-idUSKCN1B31OQ. 
184 See Martoma, 869 F.3d at 61. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. at 62. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. at 62-3. 
189 Id. at 69. 
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any instructional error would not have affected Martoma’s 
substantial rights because the government presented overwhelming 
evidence that at least one tipper received a financial benefit providing 
confidential information to Martoma.190 
The court affirmed the conviction. However, after Salman, the Second 
Circuit’s interpretation of the test for insider trading may be challenged in 
other cases.191 
4. Looking at Over-Criminalization? Andersen, Bond and Yates 
Prosecutorial zeal can be dangerous in a context where over 90% of 
cases are plea-bargained.192 If only the Rajaratnams of the world can afford 
to pay eight figure counsel fees and go to trial, what hope does the small 
business owner have to challenge the government’s view?193 An extreme 
critique of the system is found in Three Felonies a Day: How the Feds 
Target the Innocent, a book by Harvey A. Silverglate, with a forward by 
Alan M. Dershowitz.194 While Silverglate has the perspective of a defense 
counsel, he makes an important point that is especially relevant in the FCPA 
context: cases generally are settled rather than tried before a judge, thus the 
government’s view of the statute has been untested in the courts.195 
Several cases in a non-FCPA context illustrate Silverglate’s argument. 
In particular, in Arthur Andersen LLP v. U.S.,196 the Supreme Court 
unanimously reversed a trial court conviction that had been upheld by the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. Arthur Andersen had surrendered their CPA 
license, which effectively put them out of business. The reversal, though 
gratifying, was too late. The Court stated:  
As Enron Corporation’s financial difficulties became public in 2001, 
petitioner Arthur Andersen LLP, Enron's auditor, instructed its 
employees to destroy documents pursuant to its document retention 
 
 
190 Id. at 61. 
191 Id. 
192  LINDSEY DEVERS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.: BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE, PLEA & CHARGE 
BARGAINING (Jan. 24, 2011), https://www.bja.gov/Publications/PleaBargainingResearchSummary.pdf. 
193 Walter Pavlo, The High Cost of Mounting a White-Collar Criminal Defense, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/walterpavlo/2013/05/30/the-high-cost-of-mounting-a-white-collar-
criminal-defense/#47799e4110bd (discussing the forty million dollars Rajaratnam allegedly spent on his 
nine-week); cf. Jonathan Stempel, Galleon’s Rajaratnam Loses Bid to Cut Insider Trading Sentence, 
REUTERS (Mar. 3, 2017, 2:02 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-crime-rajaratnam-
idUSKBN16A2DX (discussing hedge fund mega-star’s demise). 
194 See HARVEY SILVERGLATE, THREE FELONIES A DAY: HOW THE FEDS TARGET THE INNOCENT 
(2009). 
195 Id.  
196 544 U.S. 696 (2005). 
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policy. A jury found that this action made petitioner guilty of 
violating 18 U. S. C. §§ 1512(b) (2) (A) and (B). These sections make 
it a crime to “knowingly us[e] intimidation or physical force, 
threate[n], or corruptly persuad[e] another person . . . with intent to . 
. . cause” that person to “withhold” documents from, or 
‘alter’”documents for use in, an “official proceeding.” The Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. We hold that the jury 
instructions failed to convey properly the elements of a “corrup[t] 
persua[sion]” conviction under § 1512(b), and therefore reverse.197 
The prosecutor charged Andersen with violations of Sections 
1512(b)(2)(A) and (B), part of the witness tampering provisions, which 
provide in relevant part: 
Whoever knowingly uses intimidation or physical force, threatens, or 
corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do so, or engages 
in misleading conduct toward another person, with intent to . . . cause 
or induce any person to . . . withhold testimony, or withhold a record, 
document, or other object, from an official proceeding [or] alter, 
destroy, mutilate, or conceal an object with intent to impair the 
object's integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding . . . 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, 
or both. 
In this case, our attention is focused on what it means to “knowingly 
. . . corruptly persuad[e]” another person “with intent to . . . cause” 
that person to “withhold” documents from, or “alter” documents for 
use in, an “official proceeding.”198 
The Court clarified that: 
[a] “knowingly . . . corrup[t] persaude[r]” cannot be someone who 
persuades others to shred documents under a document retention 
policy when he does not have in contemplation any particular official 
proceeding in which those documents might be material.199  
It is not criminal to have a document retention policy that requires 
periodic disposal of material. It is one thing to be ill-advised and another to 
be criminal. The vigilance born of the Enron debacle engendered 
prosecutorial overreach that was modified by the courts. In 2014, the 
 
 
197 Id. at 698.  
198 Id. at 703.  
199 Id. at 708.  
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Supreme Court struck again with a unanimous decision written by Justice 
Roberts in United States v. Bond.200 The Court found that the Chemical 
Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 did not reach a “local 
crime: an amateur attempt by a jilted wife to injure her husband’s lover, 
which ended up causing only a minor thumb burn readily treated by rinsing 
with water. . . . [I]t does not cover the unremarkable local offense at issue 
here.”201 
The aggrieved wife was persistent, and she tried twenty-four times to 
injure the husband’s lover using different compounds. She was charged with 
a myriad of offenses including mail theft, mail tampering, and a chemical 
weapons charge (18 U.S.C. § 229 (9)).202 She was convicted and sentenced 
to six years in federal prison, five years supervised release, a $2,000 fine 
and $9,902.79 restitution.203The Court reversed stating, “[i]n sum, the 
global need to prevent chemical warfare does not require the Federal 
Government to reach into the kitchen cupboard, or to treat a local assault 
with a chemical irritant as the deployment of a chemical weapon.”204 There 
was nothing funny about the wife’s action, but state law was sufficient to 
charge her with an offense without overcharging her with a disproportionate 
crime. 
However, in 2015, the Supreme Court waded into waters that 
humorously and tangibly illustrate  the problem of over-criminalization in 
Yates v. U.S., 205 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the conviction of a boat 
captain, finding that under 18 U.S.C. § 1519 of Sarbanes-Oxley, an 
undersized fish that was destroyed fell within the definition of “tangible 
object” forbidden from destruction under the statute.206 The grouper ordered 
put back in the sea was undersized by several inches, but when the Captain 
was charged – a full thirty-two months after the incident – the regulation 
had been changed, and the grouper – if caught on this subsequent date – 
would not be undersized.207 The Captain had been sentenced to only thirty 
days imprisonment with three years’ supervised release, but he would still 
 
 
200 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014). 
201 Id. at 2083. 
202 Id. at 2085. 
203 Id. at 2085–86. 
204 Id. at 2093. S. 
205 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2014); see also Dahlia Lithwick, Scales of Justice, SLATE (Nov. 5, 2014, 6:54 
PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/supreme_court_dispatches/2014/11/supreme_court_f
ish_destruction_of_evidence_case_jokes_outrage_and_hating.html (discussing Supreme Court 
Justices’ questions and jokes at the oral argument of the case addressing the disposal of fish). 
206 Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1078. 
207 Id. at 1080. 
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have a criminal record.208 He appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court 
found, although not unanimously, “[f]or the reasons stated, we resist reading 
§ 1519 expansively to create a coverall spoliation of evidence statute, 
advisable as such a measure might be. Leaving that important decision to 
Congress, we hold that a ‘tangible object’ within § 1519’s compass is one 
used to record or preserve information.”209  
Reason seemed to prevail that a fish was not meant to be covered by 
Sarbanes-Oxley. The jokes at oral argument, however, covered the very 
serious issue of prosecutorial overcharging and how hapless individuals 
may be caught.210 In these cases, the Supreme Court worked as a check on 
interpretation of statutes in a manner that defied common sense. While the 
prosecutors have not taken such extreme positions on FCPA interpretation, 
it would be helpful if more case law existed to delineate a thing “of value” 
and clarify quid pro quo in this context. Helping business acquaintances’ 
friends get jobs is commonplace in business; having case law clarifying 
where the line is would remove the uncertainty. Nonetheless, JPMorgan’s 
calculated comprehensive sons and daughters program probably would 
have been found to be a violation of the FCPA despite the question of how 
a job to a son is of value to the foreign official parent.211 However, because 
there was a settlement, we do not definitively know this, and it is unlikely 
that companies will risk litigating this question further. After lengthy 
negotiations, and despite a large settlement in November 2016, JPMorgan 
announced a record profit in July of 2017.212 
IV. POLITICAL AND ETHICAL CONTEXT 
Donald Trump confounded all the pundits by winning the electoral vote in the 
2016 Presidential election, which determines the outcome, while losing the popular 
vote, which is not dispositive. The new administration’s determination to deliver 
on myriad campaign promises made to its conservative base has provoked 
unprecedented commentary and even resistance. The ongoing national conversation 
 
 
208 Id. at 1080–81 
209 Id. at 1088-89. 
210 See Lithwick, supra note 206; see also SILVERGLATE, supra note 195 (commenting on prosecutor 
discretion and how that combined with plea bargaining allows many untested constructs of a statute be 
imposed on individuals who are unable to afford the cost or the punishment accompanying the risk of 
losing at trial). 
211 See Koehler, supra note 55, at 4. 
212 Hugh Son, JPMorgan Just Had the Most Profitable Year in the History of Banking, BLOOMBERG 
(July 14, 2017, 7:29 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-14/jpmorgan-proves-
wall-street-bank-profits-don-t-depend-on-traders; cf. Jamie Dimon Rails Against the State of US 
Politics, BBC NEWS (July 14, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-40613169 (discussing Jamie 
Dimon’s concerns about business environment). 
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about the proposed “Trumpcare” bill, which was defeated in the Senate, has resulted 
in even further polarization between political parties.213 Similarly, concerns about 
rolling back protections for immigrants, the environment, and even voting rights 
have dominated the news and fascinated commentators and satirists alike.214 
Nonetheless, there has been little notable comment regarding the new 
administration’s attitude toward the FCPA.215 However, despite President Trump’s 
previous hostile comments about the FCPA,216 Attorney General Jeff Sessions 
recently affirmed his support for enforcing the FCPA, stating:  
One area where this is critical is enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act (FCPA).  Congress enacted this law 40 years ago, when 
some companies considered it a routine expense to bribe foreign 
officials in order to gain business advantages abroad. This type of 
corruption harms free competition, distorts prices, and often leads to 
substandard products and services coming into this country.  It also 
increases the cost of doing business and hurts honest companies that 
don’t pay these bribes. Our department wants to create an even 
playing field for law-abiding companies.  We will continue to 
strongly enforce the FCPA and other anti-corruption 
laws.  Companies should succeed because they provide superior 
products and services, not because they have paid off the right 
 
 
213 See, e.g., Sandro Galea The Dysfunction Behind Trumpcare Explained, FORTUNE (Mar. 28, 
2017), http://fortune.com/2017/03/28/trumpcare-acha-aca (discussing the outrage among citizens and 
the split between Republicans on early plans to repeal and replace the existing health care law); Robert 
Schlesinger, You Can March But You Can’t Hide, So GOPers Hide, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (July 
5, 2017, 10:10 AM), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/thomas-jefferson-street/articles/2017-07-
05/republicans-keep-ducking-voters-on-trumpcare-repeal-of-obamacare (“The festering disaster known 
as Trumpcare, the GOP's shambling attempt to ‘repeal-and-replace’ Obamacare, is so radioactively 
unpopular that it's barely an exaggeration at this point to say that lawmakers scarcely dare show their 
faces in public.”); Tom Jensen, Health Care a Mine Field for Republicans; Many Trump Voters in 
Denial on Russia, PUBLIC POLICY POLLING (July 18, 2017, 11:04 AM), 
http://www.publicpolicypolling.com/main/2017/07/health-care-a-mine-field-for-republicans-many-
trump-voters-in-denial-on-russia.html.  
214 See, e.g., President Trump is Making Satire Great Again, ECONOMIST (Feb. 11, 2017), 
https://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21716628-though-some-comedians-find-his-tendency-
defy-parody-hard-handle-president-trump; Marisa Guthrie, Seth Meyers on the “Frustrating” Challenge 
of Keeping up with Trump, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Apr. 20, 2017, 6:30 AM), 
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/seth-meyers-frustrating-challenge-keeping-up-trump-
993354; Avi Selk, What Stephen Colbert Really Thinks About Donald Trump, WASH. POST (May 22, 
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/arts-and-entertainment/wp/2017/05/22/stephen-colbert-
on-how-he-does-comedy-under-a-petty-and-venal-trump-administration/?utm_term=.f1e933e986f6.  
215 For an early prediction of how the Trump administration might enforce the FCPA, see Robert J. 
Anello & Peter Janowski, Corporate FCPA Enforcement in the Era of Trump, L.J. NEWSL. (May 2017), 
http://www.lawjournalnewsletters.com/sites/lawjournalnewsletters/2017/05/01/corporate-fcpa-
enforcement-in-the-era-of-trump/?slreturn=20170708145725.  
216 See Sue Reisenger, Trump Spoke Out Against Prosecuting Companies for Bribery, CORP. 
COUNS. (Nov. 10, 2016, 12:00 AM), http://www.corpcounsel.com/printerfriendly/id=1202772127968 
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people.217 
As noted above, JPMorgan settled the case after the election, despite hostile 
comments about the statute made by Trump in 2012.218 
Trump engaged in an initial honeymoon period with Preet Bharara, the 
U.S. Attorney for New York City at the time of the election, asking Bharara 
to continue to serve in his position.219 As a New Yorker himself, Trump 
would have been familiar with Bharara’s aggressive, high-profile and 
generally successful prosecutions against white collar criminals, including 
Raj Rajaratnam.220 Within a few months, however, Bharara found himself 
out of a job when he, along with along with many of the U.S. Attorneys 
appointed by former President Obama, was asked to resign.221 For reasons 
that are still unclear, Bharara refused the request to resign and was fired the 
next day.222 Soon after, reports surfaced that Bharara had been overseeing 
an investigation involving questionable stock trades by Tom Price, Trump’s 
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services.223 There is no 
indication, however, that the FCPA is a concern in this particular context, 
or in the context of other investigations involving members of the Trump 
administration. Nonetheless, it may be significant that the DOJ’s newly 
appointed compliance counsel, Hui Chen, resigned in a rather surprising and 
noisy departure in June 2017, writing an unusual post on LinkedIn stating 
she could not work for an administration whose compliance policies she 
would find unacceptable in a business.224 Apparently, Chen was well 
received by the businesses she dealt with, according to an in-depth report 
 
 
217 Att’y Gen. Jeff Sessions, Remarks at the Ethics and Compliance Annual Conference (Apr. 24, 
2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-delivers-remarks-ethics-and-
compliance-initiative-annual. 
218 See Reisenger, supra note 217 (discussing Trump’s May 2012 comments and showing video 
CNBC clip). 
219 See Melissa Fares & Nate Raymond, Trump to Keep Manhattan Federal Prosecutor Bharara in 
Post, REUTERS (Nov. 30, 2016, 12:31 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-bharara-
idUSKBN13P2BI.  
220 Cf. Stempel, supra note 194. 
221 See Charlie Savage & Maggie Haberman, Trump Abruptly Orders 46 Obama-Era Prosecutors 
to Resign, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/10/us/politics/us-attorney-
justice-department-trump.html?_r=1. 
222 Charlie Savage & Maggie Haberman, U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara Says He Was Fired After 
Refusing to Quit, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/11/us/politics/preet-
bharara-us-attorney.html. 
223 See Robert Faturechi, Fired U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara Said to Have Been Investigating HHS 
Secretary Tom Price, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 17, 2017, 2:13 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/preet-
bharara-fired-investigating-tom-price-hhs-stock-trading.  
224 Joey Godoy, DOJ Compliance Counsel Quits, Cites Administration Ethics, LAW360 (July 3, 
2017, 4:06 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/940857/doj-compliance-counsel-quits-cites-
administration-ethics.  
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by Bloomberg in the summer of 2016.225 Upon her exit, Chen stated:   
First, trying to hold companies to standards that our current 
administration is not living up to was creating a cognitive dissonance 
that I could not overcome. . . .  
[I] felt not only hypocritical, but very much like shuffling the deck 
chair on the Titanic . . . . [O[n my mind were the numerous lawsuits 
pending against the President of the United States for everything from 
violations of the Constitution to conflict of interest, the ongoing 
investigations of potentially treasonous conducts, and the 
investigators and prosecutors fired for their pursuits of principles and 
facts . . . . Those are conducts I would not tolerate seeing in a 
company, yet I worked under an administration that engaged in 
exactly those conduct. I wanted no more part in it. 226 
She had been greeted by the legal community with modest praise 
because of her understanding of business reality and there was hope that she 
would be a moderating force in investigations.227 Trump later nominated 
former Sullivan & Cromwell partner Jay Clayton to head the SEC. This 
sends a mixed signal on the FCPA because Clayton co-authored a paper 
presented at a 2011 meeting of the New York City Bar Committee on 
International Business Transactions titled The FCPA and Its Impact on 
International Business Transactions — Should Anything Be Done to 
minimize the Consequences of the U.S.’s Unique Position on Combatting 
Offshore Corruption? 228 It states:   
This paper explores these questions and concludes with the findings 
that (1) the United States has pursued, and is currently pursuing, a 
virtually stand-alone approach to deterring foreign corruption (at 
least in terms of enforcement activity and the significance of fines 
 
 
225 Che Odom, DOJ Compliance Expert Brings Different Touch, Attorneys Say, BLOOMBERG BNA 
(July 1, 2016), https://www.bna.com/doj-compliance-expert-n57982076377.  
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Watchdog Says She Resigned Because of Trump, BUS. INSIDER (July 3, 3017, 12:03 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/hui-chen-justice-department-corporate-fraud-watchdog-resigns-
trump-2017-7.  
227 Matthew Stephenson, NYU Roundtable on the DOJ Fraud Section’s New “Corporate Counsel”: 
The Video and Some Thoughts, GLOBAL ANTICORRUPTION BLOG (Nov. 25, 2015), 
https://globalanticorruptionblog.com/tag/hui-chen.  
228 The FCPA and its Impact on International Business Transactions—Should Anything be Done to 
Minimize the Consequences of the U.S.’s Unique Position on Combating Offshore Corruption?, NEW 
YORK CITY BAR INT’L BUS. TRANSACTIONS COMM. (2011), 
http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/FCPAImpactonInternationalBusinessTransactions.pdf; see 
also Walter Olson, To Head SEC, Trump Picks a FCPA Critic, OVERLAWYERED (Jan 5, 2017), 
https://www.overlawyered.com/2017/01/head-sec-trump-picks-fcpa-critic.  
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and other sanctions), (2) this approach places significant costs on 
companies that are subject to the FCPA as compared to their 
competitors that are not—i.e., there is a significant asymmetry in 
regulation and enforcement—and (3) if these circumstances are 
unlikely to change (e.g., through a substantial portion of other 
relevant countries adopting similar enforcement postures), the 
United States should reevaluate its approach to the problem of 
foreign corruption.”229  
No doubt the landscape has changed since 2011; the UK Bribery Act and 
significantly increased international cooperation and enforcement have 
resulted in a global shift toward more symmetry. One need only consider 
the top ten FCPA enforcement actions to see seven foreign companies and 
conclude that the facts are now different from when Clayton penned that 
paper.230 Clayton’s confirmation hearings were uneventful and, subsequent 
to his confirmation in May of 2017, the industry focused more on their 
agenda of creating a uniform standard for fiduciary obligations, revisiting 
standards on investment advisors put in place by the Obama 
administration.231 Research reveals no mention of FCPA coming to light. 
The renegade Republican faction that tried to gut the independent Office 
of Congressional Ethics received a rare rebuke from Trump, the public, and 
other legislators.232 Ultimately, they were unsuccessful. Trump’s response 
may have been more about their poor timing, which may have jeopardized 
his legislative priorities including repeal of the Affordable Care Act, rather 
than his disagreement with their position. Accordingly, this incident does 
not necessarily add any insight into the new administration’s approach to 
the FCPA. 
We also note that generally shared assumptions about ethics and 
transparency are of concern given that Trump still has not released his tax 
returns. Finally, we must underline that questions surrounding the ethics of 
“donations for favors” are percolating in this administration’s view of this 
business practice. A book recently getting more attention explored Donald 
 
 
229 NEW YORK CITY BAR, supra note 229, at 3 (emphasis added).  
230 Cassin, supra note 21. 
231 Mark Schoeff, Jr., After His Confirmation as SEC Chairman, Jay Clayton is Urged to Tackle 
Fiduciary Standard, INVESTMENT NEWS (May 2, 2017, 5:48 PM), 
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20170502/FREE/170509974/after-his-confirmation-as-sec-
chairman-jay-clayton-is-urged-to; Bourree Lam, Trump Picks Jay Clayton to Head the SEC, ATLANTIC 
(Jan. 4, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/01/jay-clayton-sec/512171.  
232 Republican Congressmen Retreat From an Attempt to Gut the Office of Congressional Ethics, 
ECONOMIST (Jan. 5, 2017), http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21713848-or-how-lose-
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Trump’s son-in-law’s alleged family donation to Harvard to secure his 
acceptance,233 a notion that Jamie Dimon discussed in the context of 
business hiring.234 This may augur a similar interpretation of acceptability 
for hiring of foreign officials’ offspring under certain circumstances in the 
future. 
V. CONCLUSION: LESSONS GOING FORWARD FROM THE PRINCELINGS 
SETTLEMENTS 
In considering lessons going forward, we note with interest the very 
recent and unanimous Supreme Court decisions regarding insider trading 
and public corruption examined above. These seem to offer the “benefit of 
the doubt” approach to criminal liability, focusing on a close nexus in the 
former and an emphasis on the letter rather than the spirit of the law in the 
latter.   
Obviously, there is no such judicial guidance except through the untested 
settlements with respect to the “innovative” but problematic employment 
arrangements developed by JPMorgan Chase and other banks. Further, our 
research reveals little governmental appetite to actually enforce the threat of 
individual prosecution promised by the Yates memo. With respect to 
JPMorgan Chase and other institutions struggling to succeed in a peculiarly 
narrow environment, one must recognize and address the obvious: relatives 
of an elite business class are often those with access to the best education 
and experience opportunities. Accordingly, particularly robust and 
appropriate hiring procedures are required to avoid the expense and 
distraction of the investigations considered here.   
A compliance checklist such as the one developed by JPMorgan Chase 
is a worthy tool if properly employed. Any candidate for hire must include 
the normal scrutiny of qualifications, comparison to cohorts, disclosure of 
ties and conflicts, etc. Indeed, in particularly sensitive situations, monitoring 
of conflicts should be on-going.    
We will have to review the information provided by JPMorgan in their 
filings during the requisite time period. We assume they have been 
remediating the situation before the settlement announcement and that their 
internal efforts continue.  
It is surprising that technologically sophisticated companies do not have 
 
 
233 See DANIEL GOLDEN, THE PRICE OF ADMISSION: HOW AMERICA’S RULING CLASS BUYS ITS 
WAY INTO ELITE COLLEGES—AND WHO GETS LEFT OUTSIDE THE GATES (2006); see also Daniel 
Golden, The Story Behind Jared Kushner’s Curious Acceptance into Harvard, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 18, 
2016, 2:00 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/the-story-behind-jared-kushners-curious-
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better email review. Computer programs currently on the market effectively 
red-flag language in emails.235 Although the spreadsheet was a significant 
“smoking gun,” it seems obvious that without the offending emails, the 
DOJ’s investigation of JPMorgan may have concluded with a much smaller 
penalty. In view of the more restrictive stance on public corruption liability 
discussed above, we wonder whether there may be legal ways to help 
foreign officials’ children? A number of possibilities that would be far less 
obvious and legally problematic than the quid pro quo evident in the 
JPMorgan Chase facts come to mind. For example, well-placed bank 
executives might become resources for college admission guidance, 
including offering strong recommendations. Perhaps bank executives could 
employ those same children as nannies or personal assistants in the home, 
thereby garnering favor without the official participation of the bank. The 
new environment of “logrolling” has us thinking of other examples.   
It is difficult to make many more concrete conclusions regarding lessons 
in this new age of America in the Trump Era.” Recent research suggests that 
in the first six months of the Trump administration, fines across the board 
are down and there is a more “[B]usiness friendly stance….”236 This does 
not bode well for continued vigorous enforcement of the FCPA, but it is a 
little early to draw definitive conclusions. Given the current environment of 
the Trump Administration, a particular focus on the FCPA seems unlikely 
unless it is used to advance “America First” to the detriment of foreign 
business.  
Administrative remedies may continue to be used more aggressively 
without all the baggage of criminal prosecutions.237 Sometimes criminal 
prosecution, as in Samson, ends up with no significant penalties and serve 
minimal deterrence. President Trump criticized President Obama for saying 
funding priorities would leave many illegal immigrants in the U.S.238 The 
reality is that resources are finite, and each administration makes allocation 
decisions according to its own priorities. Nonetheless, it is possible that 
restricted resources may simply defund or contract FCPA enforcement. 
However, more optimistically, perhaps the continuing research connecting 
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238 Cf. Nolan Rappaport, On Illegal Immigration, Trump Ends Obama’s ‘Home Free Magnet,’ HILL 
(May 5, 2017, 2:20 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/immigration/332110-on-illegal-
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bribery to corruption, destabilization of democracy and governments, and 
its potential links to terrorism, as well as the growing international pressure 
in this era of cooperative international enforcement will provide the 
necessary persuasion for the U.S. to stay the course of FCPA enforcement. 
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